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“I am confident that we can make The Hague NSS 2014 summit 
a success, in the sense that we will be able to agree on an outcome 
document that goes beyond the agreements in Washington and 
Seoul. What I hope is that such an outcome document not only 
describes our common assessment of what has been achieved in the 
last four years…but that it also describes specific steps in which the 
nuclear security regime has been strengthened.”
—Piet de Klerk, the Netherlands’ Ambassador to Jordan, April 4, 2013
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T
he Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, which began in Washington, D.C., 
in 2010, has brought high-level attention to the issue of nuclear security and 
solidified the idea that the global community must work together to address 
the threat of nuclear terrorism. A second summit was held in Seoul in March 2012 and a 
third summit will take place in The Hague in March 2014. Since the Seoul summit, all 53 
NSS participants have taken steps to improve nuclear security on a national, regional, or 
international level, but significant work remains.
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This report seeks to provide a comprehensive 
overview of the progress states have made to improve 
nuclear security over the course of the NSS process, 
drawing specific attention to actions taken since the 
Seoul summit. It uses the progress reports submitted 
by participating states at the 2012 summit, statements 
made to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) General Conference, IAEA Nuclear Security 
Reports, government press releases, and media reports 
to identify actions countries have taken in support of 
the summits’ goals. This approach aims to provide a 
complete record of achievements, but inconsistencies 
in how and what states report complicate efforts to 
evaluate progress using open sources.
The consensus communiqué from the 2012 summit 
called for states to announce plans to minimize their 
use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) by 2013 and 
for the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials (CPPNM) by 2014. 
•   18 of 22 NSS participants that possess at least a 
kilogram of HEU announced plans in Seoul or have 
taken actions since to minimize usage, repatriate 
fuel, and convert reactors. 
o   Pledges were made by Australia, Hungary, 
Japan, and Vietnam to return HEU before the 
2014 summit. 
o   In April 2013, the Czech Republic became 
the 10th country to eliminate its entire HEU 
stockpile since the four year effort to secure 
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide was ar-
ticulated in April 2009. The 2010 NSS endorsed 
this objective.
•   Since the summit process began in 2010, 18 NSS 
participants have ratified the 2005 amendment to 
the CPPNM, while 17 NSS participants still need to 
act. Since the Seoul summit, a total of 16 countries 
have ratified the amendment, including eight NSS 
participants: Armenia, Belgium, France, Georgia, 
Israel, Mexico, Sweden, and Vietnam. 
In addition to the HEU minimization efforts, 
Belgium and Italy are planning to repatriate plu-
tonium ahead of the 2014 summit. Further efforts 
must be made at the next summit to encourage more 
countries to take similar steps to reduce plutonium 
stockpiles. 
The summit process has highlighted the importance 
of strengthening the human dimension of nuclear 
security and the role of the IAEA in building national 
capacity. Since the Seoul summit:
•   44 countries hosted nuclear security workshops, 
conferences, exercises, and centers. Several of 
these states are building long-term nuclear security 
training infrastructures by establishing centers of 
excellence, often in cooperation with the European 
Union, IAEA, or the United States.
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•   9 countries hosted, requested, or are preparing 
for IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service (IPPAS) missions. Australia, the Republic 
of Korea, and the United States will receive IPPAS 
missions in 2013. 
Combating nuclear smuggling is one important 
means for mitigating the risk of nuclear terrorism that 
countries have focused on throughout the summit 
process. Since the 2012 summit: 
•   22 countries took steps to prevent the smug-
gling of illicit radioactive materials by enhancing 
national and international transport security, 
expanding border controls, and developing new 
detection and monitoring technologies. 
o   The U.S.-led Megaports Initiative expanded 
to include 45 ports in 32 countries.
o   The Republic of Korea and Vietnam 
launched a pilot program on real-time tracking 
of radiological materials. 
Nuclear security is a serious global challenge that 
requires a global response to manage emerging threats. 
The progress made throughout the summit process 
is notable, but there is considerable work left to be 
done. The current global nuclear security system is a 
patchwork of laws, voluntary initiatives, and recom-
mendations. The 2014 summit in The Hague will be 
an important milestone for both the summit process 
and the evolution of the nuclear security regime. 
Summit participants should begin to define the 
future of nuclear security at the 2014 NSS, and not 
allow the summit process to end without outlining 
a strategy to address the structural deficiencies of the 
current nuclear security regime. It is critical that states 
do not shy away from bolder action to make progress 
sustainable and continuous as the four year effort to 
secure vulnerable nuclear materials comes to an end. 
The foundation of the regime needs to be strength-
ened, not just patched.  NSS participants should push 
for a more cohesive, transparent, and effective nuclear 
security regime that includes more standardized re-
porting mechanisms and review measures to earn the 
confidence of the global community. 
A worker checks for radiation as HEU is prepared for transport in the Czech Republic. In March 2013, the Czech Republic 
became the 10th country to eliminate its stockpiles of HEU since the four-year effort to secure nuclear materials 
worldwide was announced in April 2009. 
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S
ince the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in Washington, D.C., in 2010, 
states have made significant progress strengthening the global nuclear security 
architecture and securing vulnerable nuclear materials. The 2010 and 2012 summits 
brought high-level attention to the threat posed by fissile materials and spurred countries 
to take action to prevent nuclear terrorism and further enhance global nuclear security. The 
2012 Seoul summit expanded the scope of the NSS process to include radioactive source 
security and the interface of nuclear safety and security at facilities. The Seoul communiqué 
also called for states to announce plans to minimize their use of highly-enriched uranium 
by 2013 and for the entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials by 2014.
Introduction
With less than a year before the third summit in 
the Netherlands, it is important to assess the progress 
that participating states have made in strengthening 
nuclear security since Seoul and over the past three 
years of the summit process. This will aid policymakers 
in determining what work remains to be done at the 
2014 NSS and beyond. 
This report seeks to provide a comprehensive over-
view of the progress made on nuclear security since the 
2010 NSS. While the past two versions of this report 
focused solely on assessing progress made on the vol-
untary national commitments released in a highlights 
document during the 2010 Washington summit, the 
scope of this report is more expansive. It draws heavily 
from the national progress reports submitted by 50 of 
the 53 participating countries at the 2012 NSS. It also 
integrates information from country statements to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General 
Conference, IAEA Nuclear Security Reports, govern-
ment press releases, and media reports. Communica-
tions with nongovernmental experts and representa-
tives from the Washington, D.C., embassies of the 
participating NSS countries supplemented this re-
search. We believe this approach provides as complete 
a picture as possible of state activities that contribute to 
strengthening the global nuclear security architecture.
The first section of this report focuses on actions 
that states have taken since the March 2012 NSS in 
Seoul. The second section contains individual coun-
try profiles that detail the steps countries have taken 
throughout the NSS process. For the purpose of organi-
zation, country actions are divided into four categories: 
materials, governance, smuggling, and culture. The 
NSS process did not establish these categories, but they 
are used here to provide structure and context. 
•   The MATERIALS category encompasses activi-
ties that states have undertaken to secure, mini-
mize, and remove nuclear materials and radioac-
tive sources. This includes repatriating materials, 
converting research reactors and medical isotope 
production facilities to use low-enriched uranium, 
strengthening physical security, and other steps 
related to nuclear forensics and accounting. 
•   The GOVERNANCE category details efforts to 
draft, amend, and implement new legislation and 
regulations to strengthen domestic legal require-
ments and bring them into compliance with 
international conventions, recommendations, and 
norms. Also included in this section are efforts to 
update countries’ Design Basis Threat models and 
improve law enforcement and emergency response 
strategies. 
•   The SMUGGLING category describes actions 
states have taken to strengthen national capacity to 
prevent the illicit trafficking of radioactive materi-
als, such as deploying radiation monitors, expand-
ing border controls, and enhancing national and 
international transport security. 
•   The CULTURE category includes activities that 
states have taken to develop the human dimension 
of nuclear security, including trainings and work-
shops, academic programs, and efforts to institute 
best practices as defined by the international com-
munity. It also includes regional outreach, centers 
of excellence, and IAEA International Physical 
Protection Advisory Services. 
This report, like the two before it, does not attempt 
to assess the extent to which states have undertaken all 
of the recommended actions from the 2012 Seoul com-
muniqué. Similar to the 2010 NSS documents, these 
commitments are non-binding and contain numerous 
caveats. While this report is meant to be comprehen-
sive, the listed activities are not exhaustive. Some states 
may have undertaken steps to strengthen nuclear 
security that are not reflected here. Due to the sensi-
tive nature of fissile materials and associated facilities, 
not all nuclear security actions are publicized. Some 
countries also may be delaying the announcement 
of their accomplishments until the July 2013 IAEA 
International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing 
Global Efforts or the 2014 NSS. Additionally, because 
there is no standard reporting mechanism for nuclear 
security, the activities that states do report vary in 
scope and timeframe. The difficulties encountered in 
creating a comprehensive evaluation applicable to each 
state, particularly one that can be consistently updated 
over time, argues strongly for developing a standard-
ized reporting structure for nuclear security at the 2014 
summit.  
Finally, while the findings of this report show that 
states have taken significant actions to lock down 
vulnerable nuclear material, strengthen international 
norms, and enhance security culture, more work 
remains to be done. The four-year effort has been a 
useful catalyst for progress, but it cannot be the end 
of the line. The current regime remains a nationally-
focused patchwork of laws, voluntary initiatives, and 
recommendations. The 2014 NSS is an opportunity for 
leaders to take stock and move forward by defining a 
vision for the future of the nuclear security regime that 
includes greater transparency, regime cohesion, and 
continuous improvement to build confidence in effec-
tive nuclear security. 
Leaders from 53 countries gathered in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012, for the second Nuclear Security Summit. Since the 
first summit was held in Washington, D.C, in April 2010, countries have made significant progress strengthening global 
nuclear security. A third summit will be held in the Netherlands in 2014. 
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S
ince the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Seoul, all 53 participating 
countries have taken steps to improve nuclear security at the national, regional, or 
international level. These actions embody a culture of continuous improvement, 
which is critical to securing radioactive materials and facilities and mitigating the risk of 
nuclear terrorism.
Since Seoul...
The Seoul summit produced a consensus 
communiqué that focused on 11 action areas: the 
global nuclear security architecture, the role of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear 
materials, radioactive sources, nuclear security and 
safety, transportation security, combatting illicit 
trafficking, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, 
and international cooperation. It differed from the 2010 
Washington NSS communiqué in that it had a broader 
scope and called on states to take two specific actions 
within a particular timeframe. First, the communiqué 
called for the 2005 amendment to the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 
to be brought into force by 2014, and second, it urged 
states to announce steps that they will take to minimize 
the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) by the end 
of 2013. 
In addition to continuing the Washington 
summit’s tradition of states offering national pledges 
(or “house gifts”) to improve their nuclear security, 
many states expanded upon that idea and developed 
joint statements (or “gift baskets”) on cooperative 
nuclear security projects. In the 13 multinational joint 
statements issued in Seoul, countries committed to 
work together on a range of nuclear security topics 
or projects, including radioactive security, national 
legislation implementation, transport security, 
information security, HEU minimization, and nuclear 
training centers. Summaries of these joint statements 
are contained in this report’s appendix, and country 
profiles note which states are participating in the gift 
baskets. Prior to the 2014 NSS, an update of this report 
will be released which will analyze the success of joint 
statement implementation.  
This report tracks actions that countries have taken in 
line with Seoul summit principles and commitments to 
improve national, regional, and global nuclear security. 
It contextualizes state efforts within four categories: 
materials, governance, smuggling, and culture. Since 
the March 2012 NSS, approximately 24 countries have 
enhanced the security of nuclear material and facilities; 
42 countries have taken steps to improve their national 
nuclear governance structures; 22 have focused on 
countering nuclear smuggling; and 49 countries have 
taken specific steps to advance nuclear security culture. 
As these figures indicate, many countries have made 
progress in more than one category. 
The data reported here is based on the information 
provided on future plans in states’ national progress 
reports and statements at the 2012 summit, press 
releases, media reports, IAEA conference statements 
and Nuclear Security Reports, and discussions with 
knowledgeable experts and government representatives. 
Highlights about states’ nuclear security activities 
were excised from these sources, but the resulting 
list of actions reported here is not exhaustive. There 
is no standardized reporting format for nuclear 
security activities; therefore, the scope of action and 
degree of detail that states share vary. Further, some 
countries may not publicize information on their 
nuclear security work due to sensitivities about the 
material and facilities involved. Other countries may 
be delaying announcement of their achievements 
until the July 2013 IAEA International Conference on 
Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts or the 2014 
summit in The Hague. This report attempts to provide 
as comprehensive of a picture as possible of states’ 
achievements while working within the limitations of 
the data sets available.  
MATERIALS
The Seoul summit expanded the summit process’ 
definition of “nuclear security” from fissile materials 
(HEU and separated plutonium) to include radiological 
materials and facility security. This broader 
understanding of nuclear security is in agreement with 
the IAEA’s approach to the issue and better reflects the 
scope of the threat. This section discusses the steps that 
summit participants have taken since Seoul to secure 
or repatriate radioactive materials, convert research 
reactors and medical isotope production facilities to use 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel sources and targets, 
enhance physical security at facilities, and adopt 
other improvements related to nuclear forensics and 
accounting systems. 
HEU and Plutonium. The security and protection 
of fissile materials is at the core of the NSS process, 
and many countries have accelerated their plans to 
lockdown, downblend, and repatriate nuclear materials. 
According to the latest estimates, the global stockpile 
of HEU is approximately 1,390 tons, and stockpiles 
of civilian and non-civilian separated plutonium are 
approximately 260 tons and 230 tons, respectively. 
Since the Seoul summit, three successful HEU removal 
and repatriation missions have been completed: 
Uzbekistan in November 2012, Austria in December 
2012, and the Czech Republic in April 2013. 
(Uzbekistan and Austria do not participate in the NSS 
process.) The Czech Republic was the 10th country to 
eliminate all of its HEU since President Barack Obama’s 
April 2009 Prague speech in which he called for an 
international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear 
materials within four years. Participants at the April 
2010 Washington summit endorsed this four year 
objective and reaffirmed the goal at the 2012 Seoul 
summit. Implementation efforts have been primarily 
focused on HEU removals, though Sweden eliminated 
plutonium stocks ahead of the Seoul summit and 
President Obama noted the need to stop accumulating 
separated plutonium in a speech at Hankuk University 
while he was in the Republic of Korea for the 2012 
summit. 
Australia, Hungary, and Vietnam are working to 
remove their surplus stocks of HEU by the end of 2013, 
and the removal of U.S.-origin HEU fuel from Japan’s 
Material Testing Reactor is scheduled for later this year. 
Belgium and Italy intend to return excess U.S.-origin 
HEU and separated plutonium in 2014. Canada’s 
repatriation of U.S.-origin nuclear materials is 
scheduled to occur between 2012 and 2018. In February 
2013, Canada was awaiting final authorizations and 
preparations to begin transporting spent fuel rods 
from the Chalk River plant back to the United States. 
At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Sweden announced that it shipped its remaining plutonium stockpile back to the 
United States. Belgium and Italy said they intend to return excess plutonium to the United States in 2014. 
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HEU fuel from Kazakhstan’s Institute of Nuclear 
Physics has been sent back to Russia or downblended 
in Kazakhstan. By the end of 2016, HEU spent fuel 
from all converted research reactors in Poland will 
be returned to Russia. Hungary pledged to return its 
remaining HEU to Russia in 2013. 
Russia continues to cooperate with the IAEA and 
other states on Russian-origin material repatriations 
and is downblending excess HEU for power production. 
In July 2012, the U.S. National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) announced that more than 450 
metric tons of Russian HEU have been downblended 
under the 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, 
and by the end of 2013, this total is expected to reach 
500 metric tons. The United States and Russia also are 
working to begin implementation of the Plutonium 
Management and Disposition Agreement, which will 
require both countries to dispose of 34 metric tons of 
weapons-grade plutonium beginning in 2018.
Support from the United States has been critical 
in many of the material removal efforts listed above. 
By the end of 2013, NNSA aims to eliminate HEU 
from three more countries. Since President Obama’s 
Prague speech, NNSA has removed approximately 
1,400 kilograms of HEU and plutonium from around 
the world. At home, the United States has improved 
material security by consolidating the number of 
locations where special nuclear materials are held. In 
September 2012, NNSA announced that all Category 
I and II materials had been removed from Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory. The United States also 
is committed to downblending 183 metric tons of HEU, 
and as of March 2013, 146 metric tons of that material 
had been downblended or delivered for near-term 
projects.  
Medical Isotope Production and Research Reactor 
Conversions. HEU minimization is an important 
focus of the summit process, particularly efforts that 
transition its use out of the civil sector. At the Seoul 
summit, Belgium, France, the Republic of Korea, 
and the United States issued a joint statement about 
their plans to work together to qualify high-density 
LEU fuel to replace HEU fuel in research reactors. 
Separately, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
and the United States issued a joint statement 
committing to work together to replace HEU targets 
in the production of medical isotopes and convert 
European production industries to non-HEU based 
processes by 2015. 
Belgium is working to convert a research reactor 
and processing facility for medical isotopes to use 
LEU fuel. Canada has invested in alternative isotope 
development research to facilitate its transition. China 
is working to convert a domestic miniature research 
reactor and exploring opportunities to convert reactors 
abroad to LEU fuel. India continues to make progress 
converting its Apsara reactor. Japan is completing a 
feasibility study for converting the Kyoto University 
Critical Assembly to LEU fuel, and in November 2012, 
the Japan Atomic Energy Agency announced a new 
advancement in generating a medical isotope without 
using HEU. 
Conversion efforts for the WWR-K research reactor 
at Kazakhstan’s Institute of Nuclear Physics are 
ongoing, though the fuel has been removed. Nigeria 
Poland’s MARIA research reactor was converted to use LEU fuel in September 2012. Poland also committed to ship all of 
its spent HEU fuel out of the country by the end of 2016. 
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continues work on converting a miniature research 
reactor to LEU with IAEA assistance. In September 2012, 
the successful conversion of Poland’s MARIA reactor 
was announced ahead of schedule. 
Russia and the United States concluded their joint 
feasibility study on the conversion of six Russian HEU 
reactors in June 2012. The countries expect that at least 
one of the identified research reactors, the Argus reactor 
at the Kurchatov Institute, will be converted ahead of 
the 2014 NSS. The conversion of four others will likely 
follow. Additionally, Russia has pledged during at least 
three international gatherings since the Seoul summit 
that it will limit its use of HEU and phase-out HEU for 
medical isotope production. 
In June 2012, the United States announced steps 
to minimize the use of HEU for civilian purposes 
while ensuring the reliable supply of medical isotopes, 
particularly molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). These steps 
included urging the Mo-99 industry to voluntarily 
establish unique product codes for goods produced 
without HEU, preferential procurement of non-
HEU produced products, reduction of HEU exports 
for medical isotopes, and support for conversion 
of production from HEU to LEU. Additionally, the 
American Medical Isotope Production Act was signed 
into law in January 2013. It calls on the United States 
to phase out the production of medical isotopes over a 
seven year period and establishes a technology-neutral 
program to support the production of Mo-99 in the 
United States. 
Radiological Material. At the 2012 NSS, 24 countries 
issued a joint statement, led by Germany, committing 
themselves to the security of radioactive sources. In 
addition, Canada is working with the United States 
to secure all Canadian-origin radiological materials in 
Latin America and Africa. France is working to retrieve 
French-origin radioactive sources worldwide, including 
disused domestic sources. Indonesia’s efforts to 
improve the security of its radioactive sources include 
upgrades at hospitals as well as waste management 
facilities and implementation of the IAEA’s Code of 
Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 
Sources (Code of Conduct). Nigeria is continuing to 
operate a domestic program to discover and secure 
orphan radioactive sources. In the United States, 
work is underway to recover thousands of unneeded 
radiological materials from domestic licensees and 
repatriate U.S.-origin sources. 
Physical Security Upgrades. Site security and the 
interface of nuclear safety and security at facilities have 
received additional attention since the 2011 Fukushima 
accident and 2012 Seoul summit. Georgia is working 
with the United States to enhance its physical 
protection and security infrastructure for high-activity 
radioactive sources. Hungary is upgrading security 
at dozens of sites with Category I and II radioactive 
materials. Japan is working to address vulnerabilities 
at nuclear facilities, including by increasing the number 
of armed personnel and introducing new equipment. 
Morocco is strengthening physical protection 
measures at research reactors and facilities using high-
activity radioactive sources. Romania is upgrading the 
physical protection of radioactive sources at hospitals 
and other medical centers in the country. 
The United States conducted security assessments 
at all NNSA facilities and is upgrading security measures 
at the Y-12 National Security Complex and Los Alamos 
National Laboratory as well as at approximately 175 
other domestic facilities with radioactive sources. 
Security-by-design features are being incorporated in 
several domestic facilities including the MOX Fuel 
Fabrication Facility, HEU Materials Facility, and the 
Uranium Processing Facility. The United States also is 
working to enhance force-on-force and performance 
testing at nuclear facilities to increase preparedness and 
resilience. Vietnam is upgrading physical protection at 
sites with Category I radioactive sources.
In October 2012, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the 
United States announced the completion of work to 
safeguard sensitive materials at the Semipalatinsk Test 
Site in Kazakhstan. These efforts, which began in 2004, 
were highlighted in a joint statement offered by the 
three countries at the 2012 NSS. 
In addition, at the 2012 NSS, 25 countries, led by the 
United Kingdom, issued a multinational statement 
reaffirming their commitment to the security of nuclear 
information and pledged to take actions to secure this 
information. 
GOVERNANCE
Summit documents emphasize that it is the 
fundamental responsibility of each state to maintain 
effective nuclear security over all radioactive materials 
and facilities in its territory. To achieve this control, 
states implement a range of national laws, regulations, 
and rules which are strengthened and supplemented by 
their participation in international treaty regimes and 
adoption of international best practices. This section 
details steps that countries have taken to enhance 
their national governance structures, including by 
bringing them into agreement with international 
recommendations, guidance, and voluntary standards. 
Strengthening National Laws and Regulations. Since 
Seoul, many summit participants have been working to 
strengthen nuclear security regulations, bring national 
laws into compliance with international norms, 
implement new rules, and ratify the 2005 amendment 
to the CPPNM and the International Convention on 
the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). 
The CPPNM is the only legally binding international 
agreement with physical protection requirements for 
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nuclear materials, but it is limited to international 
transport. The 2005 amendment to the CPPNM extends 
protection requirements to the domestic use, storage, 
and transport of nuclear materials and sets new legal 
consequences for misuse and sabotage, but it is not 
yet in force because too few countries have ratified 
it. ICSANT, the United Nations treaty against nuclear 
terrorism, provides a definition of nuclear terrorism 
and details how offenders and illicit materials should 
be handled by states when seized. Since March 2012, 
Armenia, Belgium, France, Georgia, Israel, 
Mexico, Sweden, and Vietnam have ratified the 
2005 CPPNM amendment, and Australia, Nigeria, 
and Turkey have ratified ICSANT. In addition to those 
summit participants, eight more countries ratified the 
CPPNM amendment and six more ratified ICSANT.
Algeria is implementing new and updated laws 
and regulations to combat the illicit trafficking of 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
materials. In May 2013, Canada passed the Nuclear 
Terrorism Act to amend its criminal code and allow 
ratification of the international conventions, though it 
has not yet come into force. The Czech Republic is 
enacting a new version of the Atomic Act to harmonize 
its domestic regulations with international norms. 
All of Egypt’s radioactive sources came under the 
regulatory control of the country’s recently established 
Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority in June 
2012. Gabon is implementing its new Regulatory 
Framework of Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Security, 
and Safeguards. India updated its export control lists 
for dual-use goods in March 2013 to comply with the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. Japan established 
an independent Nuclear Regulatory Agency and 
amended its national regulations to reflect the latest 
version of IAEA Information Circular 225, Nuclear 
Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/
Rev5). Morocco is implementing a new law on nuclear 
and radiological security, which includes the creation of 
an independent nuclear safety and security regulatory 
body and export control system. Nigeria enacted a 
new law on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards 
and is amending its national regulatory law to comply 
with international norms. The Republic of Korea 
has created a Domestic Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission and is continuing work on revisions to 
national laws to enhance nuclear security regulations. 
The latest updates to Singapore’s export control lists 
took effect in February 2013. Spain is implementing its 
newly amended laws on export controls and smuggling.
Azerbaijan is strengthening its export controls to 
combat illicit trafficking. Brazil is revising its domestic 
laws and developing new rules on the physical 
protection of radioactive materials. Chile has drafted 
updated national regulatory instruments, including a 
proposal for establishing an independent regulatory 
authority, and it is concluding an administrative 
agreement to import and export radioactive material 
under the IAEA Code of Conduct. Indonesia is 
Australia’s Prime Minister Julia Gillard speaks during a press conference at the end of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security 
Summit on March 27, 2012. Australia ratified ICSANT in March 2012. 
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drafting comprehensive nuclear security legislation 
and preparing a Presidential Decree on the safety 
and security of nuclear institutions and facilities. 
The country also initiated updates to nuclear 
security culture guidelines in 2013 and is leading the 
development of a national legislation implementation 
kit, which was offered as a joint statement by 18 
countries at the 2012 summit. 
Finland is updating its regulations to reflect new 
IAEA recommendations and information security 
for nuclear power plants; it expects these changes to 
go into force in 2013. France is revising its laws on 
the security of radioactive materials and updating its 
legislative and regulatory frameworks. Kazakhstan 
is collaborating with partner states to introduce an 
internal compliance system for its export controls. 
Lithuania is modifying its Law on Nuclear Energy 
to strengthen site protection and personnel reliability 
requirements. Additionally, by decree of the Prime 
Minister in February 2013, Lithuania established a 
working group to address nuclear security issues, such 
as amending laws, improving interagency cooperation, 
and collaborating with foreign partners. In April 2013, 
Lithuania and the United States signed an agreement 
to strengthen their cooperation to combat nuclear 
smuggling. Malaysia is in the final stages of revising 
its Atomic Energy Licensing Act. New Zealand is 
finalizing new radiation safety and security legislation. 
The Netherlands is studying the development of 
an international regulatory system for nuclear and 
radiological security and corresponding domestic legal 
frameworks. Norway is in the process of ratifying 
ICSANT. 
The Philippines is drafting regulations on the 
security of radioactive materials during transport. 
Poland plans to amend its national regulations 
in accordance with an IAEA Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service scheduled for 2013. Singapore is 
amending its domestic legislation to accede to the 
CPPNM and its 2005 amendment and ratify ICSANT. 
Switzerland is drafting a strategy against cyber-
attacks relevant to nuclear facilities. Thailand 
established a network of nuclear regulatory bodies in 
Southeast Asia, and Ukraine is working to develop a 
new nuclear security plan with IAEA assistance. The 
United Arab Emirates is establishing its nuclear 
regulatory infrastructure and strengthening its nuclear 
import and export laws, including provisions aimed 
at preventing the financing of nuclear trafficking. The 
United Kingdom is combining oversight of nuclear 
safety, security, safeguards, and radioactive material 
transport under the independent Office for Nuclear 
Regulation. In May 2013, the United States’ House 
of Representatives passed implementing legislation 
that would move the country closer to completing 
ratification of the CPPNM 2005 amendment and 
ICSANT, but the Senate has yet to act. Also in May 
2013, new legislation, the Next Generation Cooperative 
Threat Reduction bill, was introduced in the Senate to 
expand support for U.S. threat reduction work in the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
Updating Design Basis Threat. States must formally 
evaluate the threat environments in which their 
nuclear facilities are operating to create Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) models that are used to inform unique 
protection requirements. Belgium is updating its 
DBT to better address emerging threats, such as cyber 
security vulnerabilities. Finland is updating its DBT 
in response to recommendations received from IAEA 
International Physical Protection Advisory Service 
(IPPAS) mission and expects these updates to go into 
force in 2013. Indonesia updates its DBT every two 
years, and the most recent occurred in 2012. In January 
2013, the Netherlands began requiring the use of a 
new DBT with a stronger focus on the threat of cyber 
terrorism at nuclear facilities. 
Law Enforcement and Emergency Response. 
Summit participants took steps to enhance their 
nuclear safety and security law enforcement and 
emergency response plans. Canada is finalizing 
a strategy to enhance domestic nuclear forensic 
capabilities. Morocco has been working to update 
its list of establishments using radioactive sources 
and ensure that law enforcement officials are aware 
of where sources are kept. The Netherlands signed 
an agreement with the IAEA for the Netherlands 
Forensic Institute to assist in developing best practices 
in radiological crime scene management, nuclear 
forensics, and cyber forensics related to nuclear security. 
Pakistan’s emergency response team for radiological 
incidents is fully operational. The United Kingdom 
began implementing its new National Strategic 
Framework to prepare for nuclear emergencies and 
joined the IAEA’s Response Assistance Network. 
SMUGGLING
Preventing nuclear smuggling requires layered defenses 
and cooperation among domestic, foreign, and 
international agencies. Summit documents underscore 
the need for states to develop national capabilities 
to prevent, detect, and respond to illicit trafficking 
and also acknowledge the need for international 
cooperation to counter smuggling networks. This 
section reviews the actions that countries are pursuing 
to prevent trafficking of nuclear and radiological 
materials by enhancing national and international 
transport security, expanding border controls, and 
developing new detection and monitoring technologies 
and systems. 
Megaports Developments. The Megaports Initiative 
is operated by the NNSA in cooperation with 32 partner 
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states at 45 ports around the world. Since the Seoul 
summit, new Megaports have become operational in 
Argentina and Vietnam. In addition, Megaports in 
the following NSS countries have transitioned to local 
control (or will by the end of 2013): Israel, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Singapore, and Vietnam. 
Transport Security and Border Controls. A number 
of states have worked together on initiatives to increase 
transport security and bolster border controls. At the 
2012 NSS, 19 countries issued a statement on activity 
and cooperation on counter nuclear smuggling that 
was led by Jordan. Japan, along with France, the 
Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, issued a joint statement pledging to 
develop a proposal on strengthening transport security 
that will be presented in 2014. 
Australia continues to improve its nuclear 
detection technologies and forensic capabilities. Chile 
is working to strengthen border controls and develop 
a centralized remote monitoring system for radioactive 
sources. Germany installed a CBRN reporting scheme 
for police and customs agents. With IAEA assistance, 
Indonesia installed a new radiation portal monitor 
at its Belawan Seaport in July 2012. Morocco is 
improving its border control and ability to detect illicit 
trafficking by working with INTERPOL, the European 
Union, IAEA, and other partners. Pakistan deployed 
radiation detection monitors to key entry and exit 
points around the country. Poland is working to 
modernize its radiation detection equipment at ports 
of entry. This includes receiving equipment from NNSA 
in July 2012 in support of its radiation detection efforts 
around the Euro 2012 games and its plans to install 
vehicle monitors at vehicle crossings on its border 
with Belarus. The Republic of Korea and Vietnam 
launched a pilot program on real-time tracking of 
radiological materials. 
In September 2012, China and the United States 
announced the opening of the Qinhuangdao Radiation 
Detection Center (RDTC) and commencement of its 
first class for China’s customs officers. The RDTC will 
serve as a dedicated training facility for custom officials 
and improve China’s counter-nuclear smuggling and 
terrorism capabilities. In November 2012, Kazakhstan 
and the United States announced the installation of 
specialized radiation detection equipment at Astana 
International Airport. This effort is part of an ongoing 
cooperation between the countries, which has received 
financial contributions from New Zealand, Norway, and 
the Republic of Korea in the past. In January 2013, the 
Republic of Korea and United States announced 
their plans cooperate with Azerbaijan to install 
radiation detection equipment at its Baku Airport. 
The United States has been working to expand both 
domestic and international capabilities to arrest nuclear 
smugglers, seize materials, and prosecute perpetrators. 
CULTURE 
The summit process emphasizes the human 
dimension of nuclear security, particularly the need 
for robust education and training programs and the 
continuous development and sharing of best practices 
among nuclear stakeholders. These activities are 
vital to ensuring that resources are optimized and 
improvements are sustainable. This section details the 
efforts countries have undertaken to improve national 
and global nuclear security culture, including hosting 
conferences and workshops, developing academic and 
training programs, establishing centers of excellence, 
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U.S. and Chinese officials cut a ribbon on December 7, 2011, to mark the commissioning of the Yangshan Megaports 
Initiative. In 2012, new Megaports became operational in Argentina and Vietnam. 
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engaging in regional outreach, and inviting IAEA IPPAS 
missions. 
Centers of Excellence. The summit process has 
inspired several countries to develop nuclear security 
centers of excellence as a national endeavor, regional 
initiative, or in cooperation with the IAEA. At the 2012 
NSS, 24 countries issued a joint statement committing 
to collaborate through the International Network 
for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers 
(NSTC and NSSC) to enhance nuclear security culture 
by supporting human resource development. Brazil 
signed an agreement with the IAEA to establish a NSSC. 
Chile, Nigeria, and Pakistan also are working with 
the IAEA to establish NSSCs and NSTCs. 
Expansion and implementation work continues on 
the European Union CBRN Centers of Excellence (CoE) 
project that was launched in 2010. Regional Secretariats 
have opened in Amman, Jordan; Algiers, Algeria; 
Rabat, Morocco; Manila, the Philippines; and Tbilisi, 
Georgia. Three new regions are being targeted for 
additional secretariats: Central Asia, Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries, and Eastern and Central 
Africa. In January 2013, the GCC countries were invited 
to join the CoE project during an event co-hosted by 
the United Arab Emirates. 
China is continuing to develop its national center of 
excellence in consultation with its partners. Off-campus 
courses commenced under the banner of India’s 
new Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GCNEP) before the 2012 NSS. Construction on the 
physical infrastructure of GCNEP continues and new 
partnership agreements are being signed. Japan 
held regional workshops on nuclear security culture, 
training courses on the physical protection and a 
range of other activities at its Center of Excellence. 
Activities are underway at Kazakhstan’s new Regional 
Training Center for accounting, control, and physical 
protection of nuclear materials and facilities. In June 
2012, Lithuania opened its Nuclear Security Center 
of Excellence in Medininkai. The Netherlands is 
advancing plans to establish a nuclear security center 
of excellence at Delft University approximately two 
years after its first group of students completes the 
University’s new master’s program in nuclear security. 
The Republic of Korea is opening its International 
Nuclear Training Center in 2013 and working to 
coordinate the center’s functions with similar CoEs in 
the region. Pakistan is home to a Training Academy 
that offers specialized courses in physical protection 
and personnel reliability, a School for Nuclear and 
Radiation Safety, and forthcoming IAEA NSTC; all 
of which it would like to see become regional and 
international training hubs. In 2012, Saudi Arabia 
established its center of excellence in King Abdullah 
City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE). 
In addition, some countries have chosen to develop 
forensic centers, laboratories, and other regional 
centers to support nuclear security culture. In April 
2013, a new European nuclear security training center 
was established in Germany to provide instruction 
to law enforcement officials and trainings about 
responding to nuclear trafficking. Russia continues 
nuclear security training at its Interdepartmental 
Special Training Centre, and in October 2012, Russia 
and the NNSA commissioned the Krasnoyarsk Regional 
Training Center, which will be used to train security 
personnel working at Russian government nuclear sites. 
Singapore and South Africa are establishing nuclear 
forensics laboratories, and Thailand is planning to 
open a nuclear forensics center in 2013. 
Workshops and Conferences. Many summit 
participants have hosted workshops and conferences 
as well as sponsored other outreach initiatives to train 
personnel and raise awareness about nuclear security. 
Belgium’s nuclear control agency has held nuclear 
security workshops. Denmark conducted a regional 
workshop on nuclear power plant security in April 
2012, and under the country’s chairmanship, the 
EU Ad Hoc Working Group to enhance the nuclear 
security of power plants issued its final report. Finland 
hosted a technical meeting on computer security at 
nuclear facilities with the IAEA and is planning for an 
international workshop on nuclear security culture. 
India hosted a two-day nuclear security workshop 
in November 2012 in cooperation with the United 
Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs. Indonesia 
hosted IAEA workshops and regional training courses 
on nuclear security, including one focused on the 
security of research reactors for IAEA member states in 
Asia and the Pacific region in October 2012. Israel has 
conducted national preparedness exercises in 2012 and 
2013, including one shortly before the Seoul summit 
simulating a response to a radiological dispersal device. 
Morocco is collaborating with Spain to enhance its 
nuclear and radiological security. 
Armenia conducted anti-trafficking workshops, and 
in July 2012, it launched an anti-corruption campaign 
with support from the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. 
Brazil hosted IAEA workshops and regional trainings 
on nuclear security and illicit trafficking. Chile is 
moving ahead with trainings activities associated with 
its specialized working group on Illicit Trafficking 
of Nuclear and/or Radioactive Materials. Egypt is 
preparing to host the first International Conference 
on Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority in 
February 2014. Mexico hosted regional events on the 
physical protection of nuclear materials, including 
one on transport security in August 2012. Morocco 
updated its nuclear security training workshops and 
seminars, and in April 2013, it hosted INTERPOL’s first 
Regional Capacity Building and Training Seminar on 
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the trafficking of illicit goods in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Pakistan hosted an IAEA workshop on 
nuclear security culture in June 2012. The Philippines 
hosted an IAEA international forum on effective border 
controls in 2013. 
In May 2013, Russia also held its “Atom-Izotp-2013” 
exercise in which law enforcement agencies responded 
to a simulated attempt by terrorists to attack a nuclear 
facility. Russia and Saudi Arabia are holding nuclear 
security training sessions at national centers and 
universities. Sweden hosted INTERPOL’s second 
Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking and Terrorism 
Analysis Conference. Switzerland offered training 
courses for radiological and nuclear security personnel 
at its national Center of Competence in April 2012. 
Thailand is conducting workshops on nuclear 
safety and security in cooperation with the IAEA 
and ASEANTOM, the network of regional nuclear 
regulators it established. Ukraine is conducting 
physical protection training courses for nuclear 
industry operators. The United Arab Emirates held 
nuclear security workshops with the IAEA, including a 
regional one on nuclear security infrastructure for law 
enforcement. Vietnam supported trainings on the 
physical protection of nuclear assets and radioactive 
materials. 
UNSC Resolution 1540 mandates that all states 
establish domestic controls to prevent non-state 
actors from acquiring nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons and related materials. Australia 
is conducting outreach activities in the Asian region 
on the implementation of Resolution 1540 and 
radiological source security. Finland is funding an 
initiative on 1540 implementation in coordination 
with a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization as 
well as national requests for implementation assistance. 
France is planning an international conference 
on 1540 implementation in conjunction with its 
role on the 1540 Committee’s Working Group on 
Assistance. Lithuania hosted a regional workshop 
on 1540 implementation in June 2012, and Mexico 
began a two-year pilot program in 2012 with the 
Inter-American Committee against Terrorism to build 
national capacities for implementing Resolution 1540. 
Saudi Arabia has pledged financial support to the 
1540 Committee. 
At the 2012 NSS, United States and other leaders 
of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT), released a joint statement outlining the 
contributions the GICNT has made in strengthening 
global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to 
nuclear terrorism. Following the Seoul summit, 
Australia held a GICNT table-top exercise on nuclear 
forensics, and Mexico hosted the May 2013 Plenary 
Meeting. Spain continues to serve as the GICNT 
Implementation and Assessment Group Coordinator. 
Australia, Canada, Italy, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, 
and the United Kingdom, organized GICNT related 
events in 2012 and 2013. 
At the Seoul summit, 24 countries active in the 
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) 
issued a joint statement supporting the summit’s 
goal of securing nuclear material and radioactive 
sources worldwide. They note that since 2010, Global 
Partnership countries have contributed more than $55 
million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund. As chair 
of the Global Partnership in 2012, the United States 
increased the level of engagement by non-G-8 partners, 
including by inviting all Global Partnership members 
to all meetings. Mexico was welcomed as the group’s 
25th member in December 2012. Of the five new 
Global Partnership sub-working groups established in 
2012, three are nuclear security-related. Canada and 
the Netherlands are working together as co-chairs of 
the new Membership Expansion Sub-Working Group 
to coordinate integration of new members into Global 
Partnership activities. Nineteen potential new members 
have been identified and efforts to engage them have 
begun. The United Kingdom, as chair of the new 
Center of Excellence Sub-Working Group, is organizing 
dialogues and provided a concept paper on how centers 
of excellence around the world can be better used to 
address nuclear security needs. The third sub-working 
group, Nuclear and Radiological Security, was approved 
in October 2012 and will begin meeting in 2013. 
In March 2014, the Netherlands will host the third 
NSS in The Hague. The Dutch NSS team is organizing 
planning meetings for NSS participants in Austria, 
Canada, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Thailand 
ahead of the summit. They also are engaging with 
the representatives from the nuclear industry and 
nongovernmental groups who are hosting side summits 
for their sectors, similar to those convened in 2010 and 
2012. Additionally, since Seoul, the Netherlands has 
organized an international table-top exercise on nuclear 
forensics and regional training courses on nuclear 
security. 
The United States has supported a range of 
international workshops and training, unilaterally and 
with partner nations and international organizations. 
In December 2012, the United States hosted the first 
International Regulators Conference on Nuclear 
Security, and in February 2013, the country worked 
with Russia and the United Kingdom on the 
Seventh Annual Nuclear Security Best Practices 
Exchange in Austria. The United States also has focused 
on domestic trainings and exercise. In 2012, six Silent 
Thunder table-top exercises were conducted in different 
states. In 2013, four additional Silent Thunder exercises 
are planned for new locations. Additionally, the 
United States conducted force-on-force exercises and 
performance testing at domestic nuclear facilities and 
the Y-12 National Security complex since the Seoul 
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summit. 
A joint statement on NSS outreach efforts was issued 
by the United States, Chile, Poland, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea 
at the 2012 summit. It notes these countries efforts to 
hold regional dialogues on nuclear security issues and 
their commitment to continue this work ahead of the 
2014 summit.  
The United States, United Kingdom, and 
France also offered a joint statement at the 2012 
summit on nuclear terrorism in which they commit to 
engage in international workshops to address graded 
approaches for characterization of nuclear material 
to ensure adequate physical protection measures are 
applied. The states also pledged to work with the 
international community to increase preparedness for 
mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism.  
Academic programs. A stronger focus on creating 
formal, academic curricula on nuclear security is 
a welcome outcome of increased attention to the 
discipline in recent years. In the first quarter of 2013, 
a group of universities in Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom 
launched a master’s degree program in nuclear security 
with the support of the IAEA. Argentina has been 
working with the IAEA to incorporate post-graduate 
courses on nuclear security and radiation safety at its 
regional training center. France updated courses at 
the Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Security 
and published new recommendations on radioactive 
transport security. Having established the International 
School on Nuclear Security in Trieste ahead of the 2012 
summit, Italy has taken steps to make it a permanent 
institution in advance of the 2014 NSS. In 2012, Italy 
also launched a master’s program on nuclear safety and 
security at the University of Pisa with IAEA support.
IPPAS Missions. The summit process has spurred 
many countries to request International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service missions from the 
IAEA Office of Nuclear Security. These missions 
entail a team of IAEA experts examining a facility 
where nuclear radioactive materials are held and 
making necessary recommendations to strengthen 
its protections in accordance with international 
guidelines and best practices. Countries must invite 
the IAEA to conduct such missions, and follow-
up visits sometimes occur after security has been 
strengthened. China and Romania have requested 
IPPAS missions, and Norway will invite the IAEA 
to perform one in 2015. Australia, the Republic 
of Korea, and the United States are preparing for 
an IAEA IPPAS mission in 2013, while Hungary’s 
mission was completed in June. In 2012, Finland 
and Kazakhstan hosted follow-up IPPAS missions. 
In November 2012, Australia hosted a regional 
workshop for the IAEA on IPPAS missions. France is 
co-hosting an international seminar on IAEA IPPAS 
reviews in 2013. 
World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).The 
nongovernmental organization WINS has played 
an important role in spreading nuclear security 
best practices among global nuclear stakeholder 
communities. All but six NSS participant states have at 
least one domestic entity associated with WINS. The 
governments of Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, the United Kingdom and the United 
States have all provided financial support for WINS. 
Lee Myung-bak, right, president of the Republic of Korea, welcomes IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano to Seoul for the 
2012 Nuclear Security Summit on March 26. The IAEA plays a critical role in nuclear security. 
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f the 53 states that attended the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Seoul, 
50 submitted reports indicating their progress in various areas related to 
nuclear security. Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Jordan did not submit progress reports. 
Azerbaijan was a new summit participant in 2012. The other five new NSS participants to 
attend the 2012 summit—Denmark, Gabon, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania—did submit 
progress reports. 
Country Profiles
The purpose of this section is to provide a 
brief nuclear security profile of each country that 
participated in the 2012 summit and an overview 
of its self-reported actions to strengthen the nuclear 
security regime. The profiles are based on countries’ 
national progress reports and supplemented with 
information from International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Reports, national 
statements to the IAEA General Conference, and other 
open source information. Also included is the states’ 
membership in relevant international conventions 
and multilateral initiatives that play an important 
role in defining emerging global standards for nuclear 
security.*
The summit process does not have a standard 
reporting requirement, meaning that the actions 
included and timeframe covered in the national 
progress reports vary by state. Some states included 
activities that pre-dated the NSS process, while others 
focused more narrowly on the actions completed 
between the 2010 Washington summit and the 2012 
Seoul summit.
For the purposes of organizing and presenting 
the material in this report, the actions listed in the 
progress reports were divided into four categories: 
*Notes on sources can be found in Appendix II. An * is used in the country profile boxes to indicate if a country 
ratified a treaty, joined an initiative, eliminated its fissile materials holdings, or donated to the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Fund throughout the summit process.
materials, governance, smuggling, and culture. 
The progress reports themselves did not use these 
categories. The rationale and description of these 
categories can be found in the introduction. Where 
possible, open source materials on any ongoing 
activities were used to corroborate progress on actions 
listed in the national progress reports and provide 
further detail.
Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, left, 
South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, and Lithuania’s 
President Dalia Grybauskaite attend the first plenary 
session of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 
March 27. 
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of nuclear materials. 
Algeria hosted IAEA nuclear safety and security 
meetings in 2010 and 2011. For the 2012 NSS, Algeria 
produced a video highlighting its contributions to 
nuclear security that played in Seoul on the sidelines 
of the summit. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Training 
and Support Centers.
Although these actions demonstrate significant 
progress in the field of nuclear security, further work 
remains, and a lack of consistency in reporting makes 
it difficult to determine how much progress has 
been made and where gaps persist. With planning 
underway for the 2014 NSS in the Netherlands, 
summit participants should consider adopting a 
standardized report form on actions outlined in the 
consensus communiqué documents from 2010 and 
2012. While these actions are voluntary, standardized 
reporting on the actions endorsed by the summit 
participants would be a positive step toward tracking 
implementation of the summit goals. 
The Seoul communiqué did set two specific goals; 
entry into force of the 2005 amendment to the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials (CPPNM) by 2014 and the announcement 
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) minimization 
plans by the end of 2013. Of the 53 countries that 
attended the 2012 NSS, all but 17 have ratified the 
CPPNM 2005 amendment. As of May 2013, 68 
countries have ratified the amendment; 32 more must 
do so before it will enter into force. Seventeen of 
the 25 NSS countries with weapons-usable materials 
detailed actions that have been completed or are 
underway to minimize their use of HEU. While these 
activities do not always include a complete cleanout 
of HEU, these commitments are significant and will 
reduce the overall global stockpiles of HEU. 
Algeria 
HIGHLIGHTS
Algeria is updating its laws and regulations to 
strengthen nuclear security. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Algeria is in the process of updating its laws and 
regulations to strengthen nuclear security, which 
will include measures on combatting terrorism, 
reducing corruption, and preventing illicit trafficking of 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
materials. 
Smuggling
Algeria developed a GPS monitoring system to track 
sensitive materials during transport in real-time. 
Culture 
Algeria hosts the North-Africa-and-Sahel Regional 
Secretariat of the European Union (EU)-CBRN Center 
of Excellence, which holds ongoing activities related to 
nuclear security. Algeria also established the Nuclear 
Security Training and Support Center (NSTC) in 2011 
and has enhanced its training programs for customs 
and border security in order to prevent illicit trafficking 
ALGERIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Argentina
HIGHLIGHTS
Argentina plays a leading global role in developing 
and exporting research reactors that produce medical 
isotopes using low-enriched uranium (LEU). 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Argentina converted its research reactors that produce 
medical isotopes, and as of 2010, they use only LEU. 
Argentina also manufactures and exports research 
reactors that use LEU fuel.
Governance
Argentina reviewed and updated its export controls, 
focusing on revising procedures for licensing to 
prevent sensitive materials and technologies from 
being transferred to non-state actors. Argentina also 
maintains and updates an independent regulatory 
system for controlling the use of radioactive materials. 
Culture
Working with the IAEA, Argentina incorporated 
nuclear security in its courses on nuclear and radiation 
safety at its regional training center. Argentina 
also hosted a World Institute for Nuclear Security 
(WINS) workshop in June 2011 titled, “Assessing and 
Responding to Nuclear Security Incidents at Nuclear 
Facilities.”
Australia
HIGHLIGHTS
Australia pledged to repatriate its remaining stockpile 
of HEU in 2013 and made significant national and 
international contributions to prevent the smuggling 
of nuclear materials. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Australia has already shut down its HEU-based 
research reactor, sent back the spent fuel and 
converted its radioisotope production to use LEU fuel. 
Australia also compiled a database of Category I and II 
radioactive sources and implements IAEA guidelines 
for the physical protection of these sources. Australia 
plans to repatriate further stocks of HEU in 2013. 
Smuggling
Australia developed new technologies that will enable 
customs officials to identify radioactive material in 
transit and has provided the IAEA with technical 
assistance for detecting and responding to illicit 
trafficking incidents.2 
Culture
Australia invited the IAEA to conduct an Integrated 
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) review, 
which will take place in 2013, and hosted a regional 
workshop on IPPAS missions in November 2012. At 
the regional level, Australia also conducts ongoing 
outreach activities on implementation of United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 and 
securing radiological sources.
Australia also is very involved in the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). It chairs the 
working group on nuclear forensics and held a table-
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ARGENTINA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: < 8 kilograms
Plutonium: None
ARMENIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Armenia
HIGHLIGHTS
Armenia passed legislation that allowed it to complete 
ratification of the CPPNM 2005 amendment in May 
2013. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
In one of the largest IAEA assistance projects to date, 
Armenia completed updates in 2010 to the physical 
protection of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant 
and radioactive waste storage facilities. Armenia 
also accounted for all of the nuclear and radioactive 
sources in the country using an electronic registry to 
accurately inventory these materials. 
Governance
Armenia passed the Draft Law on Regulation of State 
Register and Control of Nuclear Materials, which will 
regulate physical protection of radioactive materials, 
and allowed it to complete ratification of the CPPNM 
2005 amendment. 
Culture
Armenia has conducted workshops to prevent illicit 
trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in 
conjunction with the United States, one of which took 
place in July 2012.1
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top exercise on information sharing during nuclear 
smuggling events for member states in May 2012.3 The 
previous year, Australia hosted a GICNT workshop on 
public messaging around nuclear incidents. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers, Radioactive 
Sources, National Legislation Kit, Global Initiative. 
Belgium
HIGHLIGHTS
Belgium is making significant contributions to fissile 
material minimization efforts, committing to repatriate 
excess HEU and separated plutonium, and working on 
LEU alternatives for medical isotope production and 
power reactor fuel. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Belgium also is in the process of returning excess U.S.-
origin HEU and separated plutonium, and pledged 
to report on its progress in these areas in 2014. To 
minimize further use of HEU, Belgium committed to 
convert its processing facility to produce LEU and 
signed cooperation agreements with Argentina and 
South Africa on converting its facilities to produce 
LEU fuel. A feasibility study on the conversion was 
completed in 2011. With assistance from the United 
States, Belgium committed to convert its research 
reactor that produces medical isotopes to run on LEU. 
In collaboration with the United States, France, and 
Republic of Korea, Belgium also is participating in a 
project to develop a high-density LEU powder that 
can be used in reconfigured reactors that previously 
used HEU fuel sources. Belgium also is working with 
the United States, France, and the Netherlands on 
converting medical isotope production facilities to use 
LEU fuel sources. 
Governance
Belgium updated its legal regulatory framework to 
allow it to ratify the CPPNM 2005 amendment in 
January 2013.6 An update to Belgium’s Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) process is in progress. The updated DBT 
will assist the country in strengthening the physical 
AUSTRALIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: ~2 kilograms
Plutonium: None
AZERBAIJAN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Azerbaijan
HIGHLIGHTS
Azerbaijan joined the NSS process as a participant in 
2012. It established a national registry for radioactive 
sources and is installing radiation detection 
equipment at critical border posts. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Azerbaijan established a national registry for 
radioactive sources in 2012.4 
Governance
Azerbaijan is strengthening its export control system 
to prevent illicit trafficking of sensitive materials and 
technologies. The United States assisted it in drafting 
new export control legislation in 2010. 
Smuggling
In January 2013, Azerbaijan announced plans to install 
radiation detection equipment at critical border posts, 
including Baku Airport, to prevent illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and radiological materials. The Republic of 
Korea is funding the project and the United States is 
providing assistance.5
security of its nuclear facilities and will be reviewed 
every three years.7 
Culture
Since the 2012 NSS, Belgium’s Federal Agency for 
Nuclear Control has held workshops on nuclear 
security issues. 
Gift Baskets: Medical Isotopes, LEU Fuel Project, 
Global Partnership
In conjunction with the IAEA, Brazil has held four 
workshops on nuclear security since 2009, with an 
additional workshop planned for 2013. Brazil also 
has held regional trainings on preventing the illicit 
trafficking of nuclear materials. In 2012, Brazil signed 
an agreement with the IAEA to establish a NSSC, 
which may serve as a regional center for nuclear 
safety and security cooperation and assistance.8
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BELGUIM
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: .7-.75 tons
Plutonium: ~550 kilograms
BRAZIL
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kilogram
Plutonium: None
Brazil
HIGHLIGHTS
Brazil is strengthening its nuclear security culture, 
establishing a Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) 
and holding regional trainings on nuclear security in 
collaboration with the IAEA. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Brazil converted its research reactor to use LEU and 
completed repatriation of its HEU prior to the NSS 
process. 
Governance
Brazil is in the process of revising its domestic 
regulations on nuclear security to comply with the 
CPPNM 2005 amendment and IAEA regulations on the 
security of radiological sources. 
Smuggling
Brazil is in the process of improving security standards 
for the transport of nuclear material. 
Culture
Canada
HIGHLIGHTS
Canada committed to repatriate U.S.-origin HEU by 
2018 and explore alternative methods that do not 
require HEU fuels to produce medical isotopes. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Canada contributed C$8 million to fund the HEU 
cleanouts in Vietnam and Mexico. Mexico’s HEU was 
sent back to the United States in 2012, and Vietnam’s 
is scheduled to be returned in 2013. Canada also 
committed to minimize its own HEU use, and pledged 
to repatriate U.S.-origin HEU between 2012 and 
2018. As of February 2013, Canada was awaiting final 
authorizations and preparations to begin transporting 
spent fuel rods from the Chalk River plant back to the 
United States.9 Canada also pledged to invest C$35 
million in developing methods for producing medical 
isotopes that do not require HEU.10 
Canada is working with the United States on 
securing radiological sources of Canadian-origin in 
Latin America and Africa. 
Governance
Canada passed the Nuclear Terrorism Act in May 
2013, which will allow it to ratify the CPPNM 2005 
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amendment and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT.)11 
As of May 31, the ratifications had not yet been 
deposited. Canada also is developing a strategy to 
enhance domestic nuclear forensic capabilities. 
Culture
Canada chairs GICNT’s New Partners working group 
and provides financial support for WINS. Canada also 
plans to hold workshops to help other countries ratify 
the CPPNM 2005 amendment. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Radioactive Sources, National Legislation 
Kit, Counter-Smuggling.
establishing an independent regulatory authority. 
Smuggling
Chile is developing a centralized remote monitoring 
system for detecting and tracking radioactive sources.
Culture
Chile established a working group to specialize in 
illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials, 
which included trainings for the South American 
MERCOSUR countries in 2011. In cooperation with the 
IAEA, Chile has hosted nuclear security trainings and 
is establishing a NSSC.12 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Training 
and Support Centers, NSS Outreach.
CANADA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <500 kilograms
Plutonium: None
CHILE
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kilogram
Plutonium: None
Chile
HIGHLIGHTS:
Chile is making significant progress in nuclear security 
culture, working on establishing a NSSC with the 
IAEA, and developing a working group to specialize in 
combatting illicit trafficking. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Chile concluded an administrative agreement on the 
import and export of radioactive material with the 
IAEA based on the agency’s Code of Conduct on the 
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of 
Conduct). Domestically, Chile completed a draft plan 
of action on nuclear security activities, submitted 
a nuclear security bill to the Ministry of Energy 
in 2011, and is working to pursue its passage and 
implementation. Chile also is drafting updated nuclear 
regulatory requirements, which include a proposal for 
China
HIGHLIGHTS
China is increasing the physical security of its nuclear 
facilities, including through comprehensive inspection 
of its nuclear facilities and an IPPAS mission in 2012. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
China conducted a comprehensive inspection of its 
nuclear facilities that was completed in the summer 
of 2012.13 Beijing also announced in March 2012 that 
it upgraded the security at the storage centers for its 
radioactive sources. 
China pledged to convert a domestic miniature 
research reactor to LEU fuel, along with several others 
that it sold to foreign governments to use LEU fuel. 
Beijing entered into an agreement with the United 
States in 2010 to set up the Zero Power Testing Facility 
in China, which is key to converting the reactors. The 
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conversion of China’s reactor is a cooperative project 
with the United States, and has now entered the 
implementation phase.14
Governance
China began implementing regulations developed 
by the IAEA on the Safe Management of Radioactive 
Waste in 2012.15 In 2010, China signed the Practical 
Agreement on Nuclear Security Cooperation with 
the IAEA and began implementing the agency’s 
regulations on the Safe Management of Radioactive 
Waste and the Supervision and Management of 
Nuclear Security.16
Smuggling
China has developed a new range of equipment to 
detect radioactive substances, some of which were 
used for securing major international events. The U.S. 
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 
reported in February 2012 that it had certified some 
of the Chinese radiation detection equipment for 
Megaports use.17 China also worked with the United 
States to publish the Technical Guidance on Export 
Control Lists and expand the Megaports Initiative into 
the Yangshan Port in 2011, although NNSA has said 
that China has not “fully embraced” the Megaports 
Initiative, citing concerns about cost sharing, data 
sharing, and that Beijing is only scanning exports.18 
In September 2012, China established a Radiation 
Detection Training Center for customs officials.19
Culture
China commissioned the construction of the Center 
of Excellence on Nuclear Security in 2012, after 
signing a memorandum of understanding with 
the United States for collaboration on the Center. 
China is currently consulting with other countries on 
participation in the center. The Center will include the 
National Nuclear Security Technology Center. 
China has held approximately 20 training courses 
on nuclear security in cooperation with the IAEA since 
2010 and translated 12 volumes of the IAEA nuclear 
security series into Chinese. China requested an IPPAS 
mission that took place in 2012. 
Czech Republic 
HIGHLIGHTS
The Czech Republic completed the repatriation of 
its remaining stockpile of HEU in April 2013 and is 
updating its nuclear security laws. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
In April 2013, the Czech Republic completed the return 
of its remaining HEU to Russia for disposition.20
The Czech Republic also invested $162,000 in a 
project to upgrade security at Armenia’s Nuclear 
Power Plant Medzamor facility, which was one of the 
largest IAEA projects to date. The Czech Republic’s 
Central Analysis Laboratory also is used to conduct 
analysis of nuclear material as part of the IAEA 
Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. 
Governance
The Czech Republic is in the process of enacting a new 
version of its Atomic Act to harmonize its domestic 
regulations with international norms. 
Culture 
The Czech Republic has provided expertise on HEU 
disposition to a number of countries, including Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Serbia. It has held training courses and 
regional workshops on nuclear security, including 
a 2010 “Performance Testing Workshop.” The Czech 
Republic signed an agreement with the United States 
in 2010 to collaborate on nuclear energy research and 
development. Prague also has established a center of 
excellence for nuclear security at the Nuclear Research 
Institute Rez. The Czech Republic currently participates 
in the IAEA Outreach on Nuclear Activities and Trade 
Relevant to Safeguards to prevent the illicit trafficking 
of sensitive nuclear technology. 
CHINA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes*
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 16 +/- 4 tons
Plutonium: 1.5 +/- 0.5 tons
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Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers, Radioactive 
Sources, Counter-Smuggling.
Egypt
HIGHLIGHTS
Egypt’s radioactive sources came under the control of 
its regulatory authority in June 2012.
OVERVIEW
Materials
In June 2012, Egypt’s radioactive sources came under 
the control of the country’s Nuclear and Radiological 
Regulatory Authority (NRRA). The NRRA also 
established a committee for the licensing of sealed 
radioactive sources.
Governance
Egypt established an independent authority for 
controlling nuclear materials in 2009.21
Culture
In April 2013, Egypt hosted an IAEA workshop, a train-
the-trainers course, on basic electronics and nuclear 
instrumentation maintenance. In July 2013, Egypt 
will host an IAEA regional workshop on workplace 
monitoring for African member states. Egypt will hold 
the first International Conference on Nuclear and 
Radiological Regulatory Authority in February 2014. 
CZECH REPUBLIC
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kilogram*
Plutonium: None
Denmark
HIGHLIGHTS
Denmark joined the NSS process as a participant in 
2012. The country has developed a comprehensive 
database of radiological sources and has implemented 
IAEA regulations on storage, import, and export of 
these materials. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Denmark has a comprehensive database of its 
radiological sources and has implemented regulations 
on storage, import, and export of these materials 
in compliance with IAEA standards. Additionally, 
Denmark performed an internal review to strengthen 
cooperation on physical protection of its nuclear 
materials and surveillance during transport. 
Culture
Denmark conducted a regional workshop on the 
security of nuclear power plants in April 2012. While 
chairing the EU Ad Hoc Working Group on enhancing 
nuclear security of power plants, the group produced 
its final report in June 2012. 
Gift Baskets: Global Partnership, Radioactive 
Sources, Counter-Smuggling.
DENMARK
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
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Finland
HIGHLIGHTS
Finland is updating its regulations on nuclear security 
and its national DBT process in response to IAEA 
recommendations. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Finland created a nuclear security commission for 
supporting threat assessments and coordinating 
cooperation of its national actors in nuclear security 
areas. Finland is currently in the process of updating 
its national DBT process after a 2009 workshop, and 
its information security regulations for nuclear power 
plants, based on IAEA recommendations.
 
Smuggling
In 2011 Finland contributed to the U.S. Nuclear 
Smuggling Outreach Initiative’s (NSOI) projects on 
border security in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Finland also is updating its own radiation monitoring 
system and working with its own personnel and those 
of neighboring countries on operational procedures at 
borders. 
Culture
Finland participated in a pilot course on radiation 
monitoring with the EU NSTC and has conducted 
international workshops on nuclear security culture 
in 2011 and 2012. Finland also funds an initiative 
on implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 in 
conjunction with the nongovernmental Stimson 
Center. Finland requested a follow-up IPPAS review 
that took place in 2012 and committed to holding a 
Technical Meeting on Computer Security with the 
IAEA in 2013. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Radioactive Sources, National Legislation 
Kit, Counter-Smuggling.
EGYPT
Treaty Status
CPPNM: No
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: No
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes*
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
FINLAND
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
France
HIGHLIGHTS
France updated its domestic legislative framework, 
allowing it to complete ratification of the CPPNM 
2005 amendment. Further legislative updates on the 
security of radioactive materials are in progress. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
France signed an agreement with the IAEA in 2011 on 
securing vulnerable radiation sources of French origin 
worldwide, with a project underway in Madagascar. 
The first of these projects began in 2011 and they are 
continuing.22 France also committed to locate and 
secure radioactive sources in France. 
France is working in cooperation with the United 
States, Belgium, and Republic of Korea on a project 
announced at the 2012 NSS on developing a high-
density LEU fuel for reactors operating on HEU. Along 
with the United States, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
France also is participating in a project to produce 
medical isotopes using LEU fuel. Through Areva, 
a nuclear power company, France participates in 
converting reactors to use LEU fuel outside of France. 
Governance
France revised its domestic legislation, allowing it to 
complete ratification of the CPPNM 2005 amendment 
in 2013. In 2011, France passed a new law to 
strengthen the legal framework for fighting nuclear 
proliferation.23 Between 2009 and 2011, Paris revised 
its regulatory framework for security and control of 
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nuclear materials at facilities and in transport.
France coordinates the UNSC Resolution 1540 
Committee’s Working Group on Assistance, 
which helps countries implement the resolution’s 
commitments. Legislation allowing Paris to complete 
ratification of ICSANT is underway, as is a revision on 
the laws securing radioactive materials. 
Smuggling
France will convene meetings to develop a proposal 
on strengthening transport security in 2014. 
Culture
France has hosted several international conferences 
on nuclear security, including one in 2012 with the UN 
Office of Disarmament Affairs on UNSC Resolution 
1540 and another in conjunction with the IAEA in 2013 
on IPPAS reviews.24 The IAEA conducted an IPPAS 
review in France in 2011. 
France also is taking steps to strengthen its nuclear 
security culture and assist other countries in this 
area. It established the International Institute of 
Nuclear Energy, which began operations in 2010, 
and provides courses on nuclear security. In 2013, 
France also updated courses at the Institute for 
Radioprotection and Nuclear Security and published 
new recommendations for the security of radioactive 
sources in transit.25 France has signed an assistance 
agreement with New Delhi to collaborate on India’s 
nuclear security center of excellence. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Counter-Smuggling, Transport Security, 
Medical Isotopes, LEU Fuel Project, Nuclear Terrorism.
Gabon
HIGHLIGHTS
Gabon was one of six new participants to join the NSS 
process in Seoul. The government is in the process of 
enacting new legislation, which establishes an agency 
with regulatory oversight for nuclear security and 
safety. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
In cooperation with the IAEA, Gabon strengthened 
radiation detection and monitoring for the 2012 
Football Cup of Nations. In 2011, Gabon strengthened 
the domestic security of its radioactive sources in 
collaboration with a U.S. technical mission. 
Governance
Gabon signed a protocol agreement with the IAEA 
to implement the Code of Conduct on radiological 
source security in 2010. Gabon is now enacting new 
legislation, the Regulatory Framework of Nuclear and 
Radiation Safety, Security, and Safeguards, which 
establishes the Gabonese Agency on Nuclear Safety 
and Security as the authority with regulatory oversight 
of the country’s radioactive materials. 
Culture
Gabon participated in a workshop in 2010 on the 
research and collection of radioactive sources and 
organized a national training program for customs 
officers on import and export control of radioactive 
sources in 2011, with French assistance.
FRANCE
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 30.6 +/- 6 tons
Plutonium: 62 +/-1 ton
GABON
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: No
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
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Georgia
HIGHLIGHTS 
Georgia is enhancing the physical protection and 
security infrastructure for its high-activity radiation 
sources and is updating its laws on nuclear safety and 
security. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Georgia established a national register of radioactive 
sources with assistance from the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Georgia is now enhancing 
the physical protection and security infrastructure for 
its high-activity radiation sources with cooperation 
from NNSA.
Governance
Georgia is in the process of enacting the March 
2010 Law on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, which 
reflects norms in nuclear safety and security outlined 
by the IAEA and international treaties, including 
recommendations from a National Integrated Nuclear 
Security Support Plan. Georgia also is enacting a law 
on strengthening the regulations for the import and 
export of radioactive sources. 
Smuggling
Georgia operates a Second Line of Defense system 
and collaborates with U.S. initiatives, like the NSOI, to 
prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials across its 
borders.
Culture 
In 2012, Georgia reached an agreement with the EU to 
establish a regional secretariat on CoE-CBRN in Tbilisi 
in connection with the EU. The IAEA conducted an 
IPPAS review in Georgia in 2011, as well as a radiation 
security appraisal. Georgia contributes to the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC). Georgia 
continues support for nuclear forensics, including 
participating in the International Nuclear Forensics 
Laboratory workshops in 2012 and 2013.26 Georgia 
also has conducted workshops on nuclear security, 
physical protection, and DBT. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Counter-
Smuggling.
Germany
HIGHLIGHTS 
Germany has strengthened its security for 
intermediate storage of nuclear materials and has 
established a central registry to trace all radioactive 
sources in the country. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Taking into account new technical findings, Germany 
strengthened its framework for the intermediate 
storage of nuclear materials. Germany also 
implemented a system for tracking all sources through 
the establishment of a central registry. 
At the 2012 NSS, Germany led a joint statement of 
24 countries that committed to securing radioactive 
sources.
Governance
Germany updated nuclear safety regulations for 
training personnel at power plants. 
Smuggling
In 2012 Germany began the process of installing 
a CBRN reporting scheme for policy and customs 
agents. 
Culture
Germany is adapting its training programs for nuclear 
security personnel at power plants to take into 
account technical advancements. German universities 
also collaborated with academic institutions in Austria, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom to 
launch a master’s degree program in nuclear security 
with the support of the IAEA in 2013. In addition, in 
April 2013, a European nuclear security training center 
GEORGIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kilogram
Plutonium: None
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was established in Germany to provide trainings on 
responding to nuclear trafficking incidents. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers.
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, 
Training and Support, Radioactive Sources, National 
Legislation Kit, Counter-Smuggling.
GERMANY
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 950 kilograms
Plutonium: 7.6 tons
Hungary 
HIGHLIGHTS
Hungary was a new participant in the NSS process 
in 2012. It pledged to repatriate its remaining HEU 
to Russia in 2013 and completed conversion of the 
Budapest research reactor to run on LEU. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Hungary completed the conversion of its research 
reactor in Budapest to use LEU fuel and has compiled 
a national registry of radioactive materials and 
waste.27 Hungary pledged to return its remaining HEU 
to Russia in 2013. It also is in the process of upgrading 
the physical security systems of 30 sites that house 
category I and II radioactive materials.
Governance
In 2011, Hungary revised its regulatory framework for 
nuclear facilities based on recommendations from 
IAEA nuclear security documents. Hungary also joined 
the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association 
(ENSRA) in 2009. 
Culture 
Hungary requested an IPPAS mission in 2012, which 
the IAEA completed in 2013. Hungary delivered the 
advance information to the IAEA for the mission in 
April 2013.28
HUNGARY
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: ~5 kilograms
Plutonium: None
India
HIGHLIGHTS 
India is in the process of establishing its Global 
Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership, which includes 
training courses in nuclear security, and it updated its 
export control laws for dual use materials in 2013. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
India is in the process of converting the Apsara reactor 
to run on LEU fuel and put the HEU fuel at the site 
under safeguards in December 2010.29
India also is developing an advanced heavy water 
reactor based on LEU technologies.
Governance
In March 2013, India announced that it updated 
its export control lists in adherence with Nuclear 
Suppliers Group guidelines to prevent the transfer of 
dual-use technology.30
Culture
India has organized training courses on nuclear 
security as part of the Regional Radiological Security 
Partnership. India is in the process of establishing a 
Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, which 
includes nuclear security, and has signed cooperative 
agreements with the United States, Russia, France, 
and the IAEA. To launch the center, India held a course 
in November 2011 on physical protection of nuclear 
facilities. 
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Nuclear Security Summit
Summit Participants and Fissile Material Holdings
2010 and 2012 summit  
participants
Summit participants with HEU 
and/or plutonium stockpiles 
greater than one kilogram
New 2012 summit  
participants 
Non-summit participants with 
HEU and/or plutonium stockpiles
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Nuclear Security Summit
Summit Participants and Fissile Material Holdings
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Indonesia
HIGHLIGHTS
Indonesia is in the process of improving the security 
of its radiological sources, drafting comprehensive 
legislation on nuclear security, and installing radiation 
detectors at all major ports. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
Indonesia is in the process of improving security of its 
radiological sources and plans to monitor radioactive 
sources using GPS tracking.31 Indonesia converted its 
medical isotope production facilities to use LEU fuel in 
2006.
Governance
Indonesia is in the process of drafting comprehensive 
nuclear security legislation and preparing a 
Presidential Decree on the safety and security of 
nuclear institutions and facilities.32 Indonesia also is 
developing guidelines for nuclear security culture. 
Indonesian regulations require the country to update 
its DBT assessment every two years, the most recent 
of which took place in 2012.33
Indonesia also headed up a gift basket on 
implementing international treaties through the 
development of national legislation, which included 
collaborating with the IAEA on the “High-Level 
Regional Workshop on the International Legal 
Framework for Nuclear Security” in July 2011. 
Smuggling
Indonesia implemented a system to monitor all 
exports through a single window mechanism and is 
in the process of installing radioactive monitors at its 
major seaports.34
Culture: 
Indonesia has hosted IAEA workshops and regional 
training courses in 2011 and 2012 on nuclear security. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Training 
and Support Centers, Radioactive Sources.
INDIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 2.0 +/- 0.8 tons
Plutonium: 4.6 +/- 0.65 tons
INDONESIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: <1 kilogram
Plutonium: None
Israel
HIGHLIGHTS
Israel conducted national preparedness training 
exercises on responding to the dispersal from a 
radioactive device in 2012 and 2013. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
In 2010, Israel returned spent HEU fuel from the Soreq 
research reactor to the United States. 
Culture
In January 2012, Israel conducted a national level 
exercise simulating a response to a radiation dispersal 
device scenario. Additional radiation response 
exercises were held in 2013.35 Israel also held a GICNT 
workshop on nuclear forensics in June 2010. 
Gift Baskets: Counter-Smuggling.
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Italy
HIGHLIGHTS
Italy committed to repatriating its excess U.S.-origin 
HEU and plutonium by 2014 and has worked with 
the IAEA on nuclear security courses at several 
universities in Italy. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Italy committed to repatriating its excess U.S.-origin 
HEU and plutonium by 2014.
Governance
Italy is developing a national nuclear security plan to 
integrate contingency plans and coordinate national 
actors in combating illicit trafficking. 
Culture 
Italy established the International School on Nuclear 
Security in Trieste and the first session of courses was 
held in 2011. The school will become permanent. Italy 
also has worked with the IAEA on nuclear security 
training materials for courses at the University of 
Florence and launched a master’s program with 
IAEA support on nuclear safety and security at the 
University of Pisa in 2012.36 In addition, Italy hosted 
IAEA workshops on border monitoring in 2011 and 
2012. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers, Radioactive 
Sources, Counter-Smuggling. 
Japan
HIGHLIGHTS:
Japan is minimizing its use of HEU by repatriating 
U.S.-origin HEU fuel and coordinating international 
efforts on securing nuclear materials in transport. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Japan is scheduled to return HEU fuel of U.S. origin in 
December 2013.37
There is a feasibility study underway for the 
conversion of the Kyoto University Critical Assembly 
to run on LEU fuel. Japan also is assessing safety 
and security vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities and 
planning to increase the armed personnel and security 
equipment at several locations.38
Governance
Japan established the bilateral U.S.-Japan Nuclear 
Security Group in 2010. Japan also established 
an independent Nuclear Regulatory Agency.39 
In 2012 Japan announced that it is updating its 
national regulations to reflect IAEA guidelines from 
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5.40
Japan also is assisting other countries with nuclear 
security projects. Japan has donated over $6 million 
to the IAEA for strengthening the physical protection 
of nuclear material in Kazakhstan and other nuclear 
security support programs.
Smuggling
Japan coordinated a gift basket at the 2012 Seoul 
summit on the international efforts to coordinate 
transportation security for radioactive materials. 
ISRAEL
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 0.3 tons
Plutonium: 0.82 +/- 0.15 tons
ITALY
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: .1-.2 tons
Plutonium: ~ 3 tons
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Culture
Japan has held two WINS conferences in 2010 and 
2012 and provides financial contributions to the 
organization. Japan also has hosted several IAEA 
meetings and regional courses on nuclear forensics. 
In addition, Tokyo established the Integrated 
Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Nuclear Security.
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers, Radioactive 
Sources, National Legislation Kit, Counter-Smuggling, 
Transport Security.
JAPAN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes*
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1.2-1.4 tons
Plutonium: 44.9 tons
JORDAN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes*
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Jordan
HIGHLIGHTS
Jordan is coordinating international activities to 
counter nuclear smuggling and prioritizing the issue 
domestically. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Jordan coordinated the gift basket for the 2012 Seoul 
summit on international activities to counter nuclear 
smuggling. 
Smuggling
Jordan is in the process of creating a counter-nuclear 
smuggling team. 
Culture
A regional secretariat of the EU CRBN-CoE opened in 
Jordan in November 2012. 
Gift Baskets: Training and Support Centers, Counter-
Smuggling.
Kazakhstan
HIGHLIGHTS
Kazakhstan is in the process of converting its research 
reactor to use LEU, repatriating the excess HEU 
to Russia by 2014, and establishing a center for 
accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Kazakhstan shut down its BN-350 reactor and 
secured the spent fuel (more than 10 tons of HEU) in 
November 2010. It is in the process of converting a 
research reactor and down-blending and repatriating 
the HEU fuel. The fuel from the Institute of Nuclear 
Physics was returned to Russia and the conversion 
project is scheduled to be completed in 2014.41 
Kazakhstan also launched a pilot program for a 
uranium ore accounting system in 2012.42 
Kazakhstan is strengthening security at its nuclear 
sites. It signed contracts with Japan for improving 
physical protection at nuclear sites within the country 
in February 2012. The project should be completed 
by 2015. In cooperation with the United States and 
Russia, Semipalatinsk, the former Soviet nuclear 
test site, received significant security upgrades. This 
project was completed in September 2012.43
Governance
Kazakhstan is developing legislation that will 
introduce an internal compliance system for export 
controls.
Smuggling
With U.S. assistance, Kazakhstan installed specialized 
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radiation detection equipment at Astana International 
Airport in November 2012. 
Culture
In conjunction with the United States, Kazakhstan 
conducted an exercise on responding to incidents 
during the transport of nuclear materials in January 
2012. Kazakhstan also launched its Regional Training 
Center for accounting, control, and physical protection 
of nuclear materials and facilities in February 2012. 
The IAEA also conducted a follow-up IPPAS mission in 
Kazakhstan in 2012. 
Gift Baskets: Global Partnership, Training and 
Support Centers, Radioactive Sources, National 
Legislation Kit, Semipalatinsk.
KAZAKHSTAN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 10.5-10.9 tons
Plutonium: > 3 tons
LITHUANIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Lithuania
HIGHLIGHTS
Lithuania joined the NSS process as a participant 
in 2012. Lithuania updated its legal regulations 
for physical protection of its nuclear facilities and 
materials and established a nuclear security center of 
excellence in June 2012.
OVERVIEW
Governance
Lithuania reviewed and updated its Requirements 
for Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and 
Nuclear Materials. It is now in the process of 
enhancing controls over radioactive materials based 
on IAEA standards and updating its criminal code 
to include illicit trafficking offenses. Lithuania also is 
implementing the best practices identified by the EU’s 
Ad Hoc Group report on safety and security of nuclear 
facilities.
By decree of the Prime Minister in February 2013, 
Lithuania established a working group to address 
nuclear security issues such as amending laws, 
improving interagency cooperation, and collaborating 
with foreign partners.
In April 2013, Lithuania and the United States signed 
an agreement to strengthen their cooperation to 
combat nuclear smuggling.44 The agreement includes 
plans to enhance Lithuania’s control of radioactive 
material, improve its legal framework, and expand the 
country’s role as a regional mentor for nuclear security 
issues. 
Culture 
Lithuania established a Nuclear Security Centre of 
Excellence in 2012. The Centre will host trainings, 
specialized seminars, and simulation exercises 
on nuclear security, including countering nuclear 
smuggling activities.45 Lithuania also hosted a regional 
workshop on implementation of UNSC Resolution 
1540 in June 2012.46 Lithuania’s nuclear power plant 
also joined WINS in 2012. 
Gift Baskets: Counter-Smuggling, Training and 
Support Centers.
Malaysia
HIGHLIGHTS
Malaysia is revising its domestic laws to create a 
comprehensive nuclear law that will allow it to ratify 
the CPPNM 2005 amendment and ICSANT. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Malaysia is currently revising its Atomic Energy 
Licensing Act to become a comprehensive nuclear 
MALAYSIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: No
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
law that will allow it to ratify international treaties, 
including the CPPNM, its 2005 amendment and 
ICSANT.47 Previously, Malaysia passed the Strategic 
Trade Act 2010, which includes controls on exports, 
transshipments, and transit of sensitive materials and 
technology. The law entered into force in January 2011.
Smuggling
Malaysia participates in the Container Security 
Initiative and its Megaports in Port Klang and Tanjung 
Pelepas will transition to local control in September 
2013. 
Culture 
Malaysia established a NSSC and has hosted several 
bilateral, regional, and international nuclear security 
capacity building activities, some in conjunction with 
the IAEA. These workshops cover a wide-array of 
nuclear security topics, including physical protection 
of materials and facilities. 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Training 
and Support Centers, Radioactive Sources, National 
Legislation Kit, Counter-Smuggling.
Mexico
HIGHLIGHTS
Mexico sent its remaining HEU to the United States 
for disposition and implemented a new export control 
system to prevent illicit trafficking. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Mexico sent its remaining HEU stocks back to the 
United States for disposition in February 2012. Its 
research reactor at Veracruz also has been converted 
to run on LEU fuel.
Governance
Mexico created an intergovernmental committee 
to harmonize domestic laws with international 
obligations on nuclear safety and security. The panel 
is taking into account recommendations from a 2011 
IAEA International Regulatory Review Service mission.
Smuggling
Mexico implemented a new export control system in 
August 2012.48 Mexico also enhanced its abilities to 
detect illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through 
personnel trainings and deploying more radiation 
detection monitors at key borders and ports, such as 
Altamira, Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo, and Veracuz in 
2012.49
Culture 
Mexico hosted several regional events on the physical 
protection of nuclear materials and a workshop with 
the IAEA on illicit trafficking. Mexico is currently 
involved with a two year pilot program (2012-2014) 
with the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism 
to build national capacities for implementation of 
UNSC Resolution 1540. In December 2012, Mexico 
became the 25th member of the Global Partnership 
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction (Global Partnership). 
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Training 
and Support Centers.
MEXICO
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: < 1 kilogram*
Plutonium: None
Morocco
HIGHLIGHTS
Morocco has made efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of its accounting system for nuclear 
33
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r 
G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
material and radioactive sources. Morocco also is 
a regional leader in efforts to improve cooperation 
on nuclear security culture. It has been active in the 
expansion of centers of excellence in the region, 
and has hosted workshops and conducted regional 
outreach on nuclear smuggling prevention. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Since the start of the summit process in 2010, Morocco 
has established an accounting system for nuclear 
material and a national register for radioactive 
sources. The list of establishments that use radioactive 
sources was updated, and this information was 
provided to district police. Morocco also is working to 
strengthen physical protection measures at research 
reactors and facilities using high-activity radioactive 
sources.
Governance 
Morocco is currently implementing a new law on 
nuclear and radiological safety and security that 
was adopted in 2011. Morocco worked with the EU 
and United States to develop an action plan for 
new import and export control laws. It also is one 
of the recipient states of joint EU-IAEA assistance to 
implement domestic nuclear and radiological security 
improvements.50 
Culture
Morocco currently serves as the chair of the GICNT’s 
Response and Mitigation Working Group, and hosted 
the GICNT’s mid-year Implementation and Assessment 
Group meeting in Marrakech in February 2012. Prior to 
that, the country hosted a GICNT exercise on response 
to malicious acts involving radioactive materials 
in Rabat in March 2011. In May 2013, Morocco co-
organized the GICNT Radiological Emergency 
Management Exercise with Spain. 
Morocco was operating an IAEA NSSC prior to the 
first NSS in 2010. That center has now become part of 
the growing number of “centers of excellence” that 
the NSS process is highlighting as a tool for regional 
cooperation and best practice development in nuclear 
security. Morocco also is participating in the network 
of EU CBRN centers; the Regional Secretariat for the 
African Atlantic Façade officially opened in March 
2013. 
Morocco’s commitment to nuclear security also is 
evident in the number of workshops and seminars it 
has hosted throughout the summit process. A national 
training seminar on physical protection of nuclear 
facilities and a regional training course were held 
in 2012.51 Morocco hosted the first-ever INTERPOL 
seminar on trafficking in illicit goods in the Middle 
East and North Africa region in April 2013. 
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources, NSS Outreach 
Efforts, Training and Support Centers, Global Initiative.
MOROCCO
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
The Netherlands
HIGHLIGHTS
The Netherlands will host the third NSS in 2014, and 
has made broad efforts to improve nuclear security 
culture through trainings and exercises. The Dutch also 
made changes to domestic regulatory structures to 
better address the threat of nuclear terrorism.
OVERVIEW
Governance
The Netherlands has demonstrated leadership in 
highlighting the connection between nuclear security 
and cyber security, and the risks both pose to regional 
and global security. The Dutch government began 
requiring that the nuclear sector use a DBT for cyber 
terrorism in January 2013. It also signed an agreement 
with the IAEA in September 2012 for the Netherlands 
Forensics Institute to develop best practices in 
radiological crime scene management, nuclear 
forensics, and cyber forensics as it applies to nuclear 
security.52
The IAEA conducted an IPPAS follow-up mission 
in February 2012, and the Centre for Conflict and 
Security Law based at Utrecht and Sheffield is 
studying the development of corresponding domestic 
and international regulatory systems for nuclear and 
radiological security. 
Culture
In 2009, the Netherlands hosted a GICNT plenary 
meeting and is now chairing its Nuclear Detection 
Working Group, which is developing a series of 
guidance documents on improving detection 
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capability.53  The Reactor Institute, in Delft, is part of 
a group of universities from five European countries 
that together established a master’s program in 
nuclear security in October 2012.54  The program 
officially launched in April 2013, and two years after 
the first students graduate, a nuclear security center of 
excellence will be established to coordinate ongoing 
education and training. The Dutch also coordinated 
international meetings and exercises on nuclear 
security including an international table-top exercise 
on nuclear forensics in May 2013. Additionally, the 
Netherlands is serving as co-chair of the newly-
formed New Partners Working Group under the Global 
Partnership.
The Netherlands also provides significant financial 
support to nuclear security efforts domestically—
through grants to the private sector to strengthen the 
role of the nuclear industry and nongovernmental 
organizations in nuclear security—and internationally 
through various contributions, including one in 
support of Kazakhstan’s nuclear security programs. The 
country also is serving as the host and coordinator of 
the next NSS, scheduled for March 2014 in The Hague. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Global 
Partnership, Medical Radioisotopes, Nuclear 
Information Security, Training and Support Centers, 
Global Initiative. 
THE NETHERLANDS
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: .73-.81 tons
Plutonium: None
NEW ZEALAND
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
New Zealand
HIGHLIGHTS
New Zealand is engaged in regional and international 
efforts to improve global nuclear security and is close 
to ratifying key international nuclear terrorism treaties.
OVERVIEW
Materials
New Zealand participated in a cooperative effort to 
secure radioactive sources in Cambodia along with 
Australia and the Southeast Asia Radiological Security 
Partnership. 
Governance
New Zealand is taking the final legislative steps 
necessary to ratify the ICSANT and CPPNM 2005 
amendment. The relevant legislation also includes 
guidance for the country to comply with the IAEA’s 
Code of Conduct. 
Culture
New Zealand has made in-kind contributions to several 
international efforts to improve nuclear security and 
has provided financial support to WINS. These include 
a 2010 donation of radiological monitoring equipment 
to Ukraine’s Boryspol International Airport in Kiev, in 
support of the U.S. NSOI. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Global Partnership, Nuclear Information 
Security.
Nigeria
HIGHLIGHTS
Nigeria is a leader in regional efforts to improve 
access to nuclear security training and to improve the 
physical protection of facilities that contain nuclear 
and radiological material. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
Nigeria upgraded physical protection of nuclear 
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and radiological materials and installed radiation 
portal monitors at major seaports and the Murtala 
Mohammed International Airport to improve the 
country’s detection capability.55 A program to discover 
and secure orphan radioactive sources was expanded 
in 2011, and the process to convert the country’s only 
research reactor from HEU to LEU is underway.56
Governance
Nigeria is in the process of updating its existing national 
nuclear regulatory law. The new National Nuclear 
Legislation will be more robust and better regulate the 
emerging domestic nuclear energy industry.57 
Culture
Nigeria hosted a meeting and workshop of the Economic 
Community of West African States ambassadors on 
nuclear security in 2011, and the country is supporting 
regional efforts to improve nuclear security training. 
The Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission is cooperating 
with five university-based Nuclear Research Centres 
and the central training facility in Sheda, Abuja, to better 
coordinate degree and professional programs in nuclear 
technology and nuclear security.58
Gift Baskets: NSS Outreach.
NORWAY
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-9 kilograms
Plutonium: None
NIGERIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1 kilogram
Plutonium: None
Norway
HIGHLIGHTS
Norway provided significant financial assistance for 
nuclear security efforts in the developing world and 
participated in cooperative efforts to secure borders. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Norway is in the process of ratifying ICSANT, having 
signed the treaty and passed the legislation necessary 
for ratification. In addition, Norway reported on its 
efforts to implement UNSC Resolution 1540 and 
provided information to assist other countries with 
their own implementation processes. It has also 
adopted the IAEA’s Code of Conduct.
Culture
A Norwegian university is part of a consortium of 
institutions in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, that use course material 
produced by the International Nuclear Security 
Education Network in the first ever comprehensive 
master’s degree program in nuclear security in 2013.59 
Norway also is inviting the IAEA to perform an IPPAS 
mission in 2015. 
Norway supported a number of efforts abroad to 
improve nuclear security, including a U.S. and Kazakh 
initiative to secure borders and prevent smuggling in 
central Asia. These efforts included the installation of 
radiation detection sensors at the Astana International 
Airport. Norway hosted the 2nd Symposium on HEU 
Minimization in Vienna in January 2012 in cooperation 
with Austria and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Norway has a long history of providing nuclear 
safety and security assistance in north-western 
Russia. The latest contribution was a $4.7 million to 
the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
in 2012. Norway pledged $3.6 million in 2010 and $1 
million in 2012 to IAEA programs to increase security 
at nuclear facilities in developing countries. Norway 
also contributed $5 million toward the establishment 
of the IAEA’s fuel bank and made financial 
contributions to WINS.  
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Global Partnership, Nuclear Information 
Security.
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PAKISTAN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 2.75 +/- 1 tons
Plutonium: .14 +/-.05 tons
Pakistan
HIGHLIGHTS
Pakistan has made strides to improve its nuclear 
security culture, both through regional and 
international training courses and through domestic 
legislation. 
OVERVIEW
Governance
Pakistan renewed its 2006 Nuclear Security Action 
Plan in 2011 and revised its export controls list 
to include nuclear related technologies. In 2012, 
Pakistan announced an inter-agency effort to better 
coordinate the emergency response to potential 
nuclear or radiological disasters, which has since been 
implemented. The Nuclear Emergency Management 
System is being managed by the Nuclear and 
Radiological Emergency Support Centre and involves 
several of Pakistan’s national agencies and other first 
responders. 
Smuggling 
Pakistan is in the process of installing a more robust 
system to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radiological material. As of September 2012, eight 
entry and exit points were equipped with radiation 
portal monitors. These installations eventually will be 
completed at all key border crossings.60
Culture
In 2012, Pakistan hosted an IAEA workshop on nuclear 
security culture.61 Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division 
established a training academy to provide special 
courses in physical protection and personnel reliability 
near Islamabad. Additionally, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Authority is working to set up a NSTC, which will act 
as a regional and international hub for education and 
training in nuclear security. The curriculum provided 
by both of these institutions is meant to build capacity 
to improve nuclear security both in Pakistan and 
internationally. 
Gift Baskets: Training and Support Centers.
Philippines 
HIGHLIGHTS
Since the 2010 NSS, the government of the Philippines 
has been focused on securing radioactive sources 
within the country and contributing to regional 
security through cooperative and anti-smuggling 
efforts. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
The Philippines is cooperating with the U.S. and 
Australian governments to secure radioactive sources 
in their country and in the surrounding region. Under 
this program, the Philippines Nuclear Research 
Institute established a team to search for and secure 
radioactive sources, acquired a suite of monitoring 
equipment for detection and response, and conducts 
trainings. 
Governance
In March 2010, the IAEA accepted an Integrated 
Nuclear Security Support Plan from the IAEA. Later 
that year, the legislature passed a bill to improve 
safety and security of hazardous and radioactive 
waste, and is currently drafting regulations on the 
security of radioactive materials in transit.62
Smuggling
The Port of Manila in the Philippines has been part of 
the Megaports Initiative since 2006. In 2012, radiation 
detection equipment was installed at the Port of Cebu 
as part of the Megaports Initiative.
Culture
In 2010, the Philippines entered into an agreement 
with NNSA to provide radiological security incident 
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response training to the national police force. Prior 
to the March 2012 NSS, two trainings were held. The 
country also hosted the third review meeting of the 
Radiological Security Partnerships in January 2012. 
In February 2013, the Philippines hosted the IAEA 
International Forum on Effective Border Controls 
workshop, and in March 2013, a regional secretariat 
of the CBRN centers of excellence opened in the 
country.63
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Nuclear Information Security, Training and 
Support Centers, Counter-Smuggling.
PHILIPPINES
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Poland
HIGHLIGHTS
Poland’s main accomplishments since the start of 
the NSS process include engaging in regional efforts 
to prevent radiological terrorism at major public 
events. Additionally, its spent HEU fuel shipment to 
Russia is the largest single repatriation mission ever 
undertaken.
OVERVIEW
Materials
In 2010, Poland returned all of its spent HEU fuel to 
Russia in the largest single shipment of its kind.64 
Since then, projects to convert Poland’s research 
reactors have been underway. The conversion 
of MARIA was completed ahead of schedule in 
September 2012, and the EVA’s conversion is 
scheduled for completion by the end of 2016.65
Governance 
Poland amended its national law to better enable 
government agencies to act to improve nuclear 
POLAND
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kilograms
Plutonium: None
security after it received an IAEA IPPAS mission in 
December 2011. 
Smuggling
Poland modernized its radiation detection equipment 
at ports of entry and is cooperating with NNSA. With 
U.S. support, Poland has upgraded the radiometric 
control systems along its borders, installed radiation 
portal monitors at the Medyka and Korczowa border 
crossings, and received mobile radiation detection 
equipment for police use at airports and other key 
locations.66
Culture
In 2010, Poland hosted a regional seminar for Central 
and Eastern European countries to promote nuclear 
security improvements. In advance of several major 
public events, including the UEFA European Football 
Championship, Poland worked with the IAEA to 
ensure adequate security by holding trainings and 
receiving radiation detection equipment. 
Two additional IAEA missions are planned for 2013; 
Poland will accept an Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure 
Review, after which it will amend its national 
regulations accordingly. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Global Partnership, NSS Outreach.
Republic of Korea 
HIGHLIGHTS
The Republic of Korea (ROK) hosted the second NSS 
in Seoul in 2012. It also has made significant progress 
updating its domestic legal structures and is leading 
regional efforts to improve nuclear security in East Asia. 
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
OVERVIEW
Materials
In cooperation with the United States, France, and 
Belgium, the ROK developed a joint statement on 
creating a high-density LEU fuel and is assisting 
several countries with reactor conversions. 
Governance
Since 2010, the ROK has improved its domestic 
nuclear security capacity. It established a nuclear 
security unit within the Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Control in April 2011 and also 
created the Domestic Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission to better coordinate safety and security 
management efforts. The government also is in the 
process of updating and revising relevant national 
laws to further enhance security capacity. 
Smuggling
The port of Busan has been part of the Megaports 
Initiative since 2009 and is scheduled to be transferred 
to local authority in 2014.67 Additionally, the ROK made 
a $300,000 contribution to NNSA-led anti-smuggling 
efforts in Azerbaijan in January 2013.68  The ROK 
also launched a pilot program to track radiological 
materials in real-time. The program monitors 4,000 
sources domestically, and will soon be installed in 
Vietnam. 
Culture
The ROK’s efforts to improve nuclear security culture 
have been significant since the start of the summit 
process. The ROK invited the IAEA to conduct an IPPAS 
mission in 2013.69 In 2011, the ROK hosted the GICNT’s 
plenary meeting in June, an IAEA regional exercise on 
nuclear forensics in August, and a WINS workshop on 
nuclear material tracking and detection in November.70 
The ROK hosted the 2012 NSS in Seoul, which was 
attended by 53 countries. Side summits by the nuclear 
industry and nongovernmental community were 
also held. The International Nuclear Security Training 
Center, which will conduct trainings and coordinate 
with existing centers in Japan and China, opened in 
2013. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Transport Security, LEU Fuel Project, Nuclear 
Information Security, Training and Support Centers, 
NSS Outreach, Counter-Smuggling.
Romania
HIGHLIGHTS
Romania joined the NSS process in 2012 as one of 
six new summit participants in Seoul. The country 
engaged in international efforts to improve domestic 
physical protection of nuclear and radiological 
material. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
The National Commission for Nuclear Activities 
Control in Romania is cooperating with the U.S. 
Department of Energy to implement an agreement 
to upgrade the security of radioactive sources and 
nuclear material in Romania. Physical protection 
upgrades at the research institute for Physics and 
Nuclear Engineering, Horia Hulubei, are underway, as 
are ongoing upgrades at two Romanian hospitals.71
Culture
Romania is contributing to regional efforts to improve 
nuclear security culture and taking advantage of 
available IAEA services to improve domestic capacity. 
The country contributed 500,000 euro to the ongoing 
efforts to secure the Chernobyl facility in Ukraine, and 
also participated in a joint exercise with Norway in 
2011 to improve radiological emergency protection 
and intervention. The Romanian government invited 
the IAEA to conduct an IPPAS mission in 2012.72  There 
are reports that the number of countries requesting 
missions outpaces the number of available teams, so 
it has not been scheduled as of this report’s writing.  
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ROMANIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
RUSSIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 737 +/- 120 tons
Plutonium: 128 +/- 8 tons
Russia
HIGHLIGHTS
Russia has played a major role in many of the material 
removals and repatriations throughout the summit 
process, most recently receiving a shipment of HEU 
fuel from Ukraine. Russia also is contributing to HEU 
minimization efforts domestically. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
Since the summit process began, Russia has 
repatriated over 1,500 kilograms (kg) of HEU fuel from 
12 countries. In 2012, Russia took back nearly all of 
Ukraine’s fresh HEU fuel. In 2011, Russia received nearly 
100 kg of fresh HEU fuel from Belarus and Ukraine, and 
90 kg of spent fuel from Poland and Serbia. Prior to 
the summit process, Russia received a total of 250 kg 
of spent HEU fuel in four separate shipments, and one 
shipment of 30 kg of fresh HEU fuel.73 Russia received 
Romania’s remaining spent HEU fuel by air in 2009 in 
the first mission of its kind.74
Russia is engaged in several projects to minimize 
reliance on HEU. In cooperation with the United States, 
Russia has continued its work to convert HEU-fueled 
research reactors to LEU fuel. The countries concluded 
their joint feasibility study on the conversion of six 
Russian HEU reactors in June 2012. They expect that at 
least one of the identified research reactors, the Argus 
reactor at the Kurchatov Institute, to be converted ahead 
of the 2014 NSS and the rest to follow. Roughly 30 tons 
of excess military HEU is downblended each year to 
LEU for use in power generation, and a total of 500 tons 
will be downblended by the end of 2013. Russia also 
has expressed its intention to restrict exports of medical 
isotopes to those produced with LEU. 
Additionally, Russia has pledged at three or more 
international gatherings since the Seoul summit that 
it will limit its use of HEU and phase-out HEU for 
medical isotope production.
Governance 
In an effort to modernize the management 
mechanisms for nuclear safety and security, Russia 
passed the Federal Law on Radioactive Waste 
Management in July 2011. 
Smuggling
Russia currently maintains a national register of 
radioactive sources to account for and track this 
material. In September 2011, Russia announced 
that it had successfully installed portal monitoring 
equipment at every border crossing in the country.75
Culture
Russia serves as a co-chair of the GICNT, and in 
September 2012 hosted a GICNT exercise that 
demonstrated new nuclear forensics technology 
and emergency response efforts. Russia also holds 
nuclear security training sessions that are open to 
international participants at the Interdepartmental 
Special Training Centre in Obninsk. This center is one 
of several that are leading the way toward making 
nuclear security trainings accessible to participants 
from around the world, and is part of the summit 
initiative to coordinate between centers of excellence 
in various countries to provide essential training. There 
also is ongoing cooperation between the Russian 
government, IAEA, and Tomsk Polytechnic University, 
which launched a program in Nuclear Control and 
Regulation in Nuclear Security in 2009. The program’s 
curriculum is based on IAEA guidance and accredited 
by the Russian regulator.76
Gift Baskets: Global Partnership, Global Initiative.
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SINGAPORE
Treaty Status
CPPNM: No
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: No
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
SAUDI ARABIA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Saudi Arabia
HIGHLIGHTS
Saudi Arabia is planning to build a large nuclear 
energy program over the next 20 years. Given 
these plans, the country is focused on building up 
its domestic infrastructure to regulate, operate, and 
maintain the future fleet of electricity-generating 
reactors.
OVERVIEW
Governance
In 2011, the Saudi government announced that it 
intended to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next 
20 years, and that this activity would be managed 
by K.A. CARE, the King Abdhullah City for Atomic 
and Renewable Energy, a city established in 2010 
and dedicated to the management, construction, 
and regulation of the country’s new nuclear energy 
program. 
Culture
Saudi Arabia contributed to regional efforts to ensure 
the safe and secure deployment of nuclear technology. 
A center of excellence was established in 2012, and 
regional training courses are being held at the Naïf 
Arab University for Security Sciences in cooperation 
with the IAEA. 
Saudi Arabia held several workshops on UNSC 
Resolution 1540 implementation efforts, with two 
additional workshops planned for 2013. The Saudi 
mission to the UN also announced a $500,000 
contribution to the UNSC Resolution 1540 Committee 
in 2012, a contribution that will be used to help that 
organization execute its mandate to collect and 
oversee country reporting on weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) prevention efforts. 
Singapore
HIGHLIGHTS
Singapore’s efforts to improve nuclear security have 
centered on improving nuclear forensics and detection 
capabilities through domestic action and regional 
cooperation. 
OVERVIEW 
Governance 
Singapore is in the process of amending its domestic 
legislation in order to ratify the CPPNM and its 2005 
amendment, as well as ICSANT. In February 2013, 
Singapore completed its most recent update of its 
export control list and submitted its latest report to the 
UNSC Resolution 1540 Committee in May 2013.
Smuggling 
In 2013, Singapore plans to establish a nuclear 
forensics laboratory, which will allow the country 
to improve detection capability. In 2011, Singapore 
hosted a workshop on nuclear detection and 
forensics in cooperation with the EU and the United 
States. Singapore also has cooperated with the U.S. 
Megaports Initiative since 2006, and officially took 
control of implementation of the initiative in June 
2012. The successful transfer to local authority is a key 
goal of the Megaports program.
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources.
South Africa
HIGHLIGHTS
South Africa has contributed to efforts to minimize 
the use of HEU around the world, with technical 
advancements that allow production of crucial medical 
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isotopes using LEU. 
OVERVIEW 
Materials
South Africa completed its conversion of 
molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) medical isotope production 
to LEU in 2011. 
Governance
South Africa revised its domestic regulations to 
build capacity for nuclear security efforts and 
implementation is ongoing. Other domestic efforts 
include the use of the IAEA’s Self-Assessment Tool and 
the inclusion of recommendations from an Integrated 
Nuclear and Infrastructure Review.
Culture 
South Africa is in the process of establishing a national 
nuclear forensics laboratory, which will include a 
nuclear security training component. The laboratory 
and training program are the result of collaborations 
between South Africa’s Nuclear Energy Corporation 
and the IAEA. 
SPAIN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
SOUTH AFRICA
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: No
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 600 kilograms
Plutonium: None
Spain
HIGHLIGHTS
Spain is contributing to domestic and regional efforts 
to improve nuclear security culture through trainings 
and collaborative initiatives. 
OVERVIEW 
Governance 
Spain launched a nuclear forensics task force in 
2011, and amended its anti-smuggling act and 
export control regulations. Spain also has served 
as the GICNT Implementation Assessment Group 
Coordinator since 2010 and hosted the group’s 
meeting in 2011. 
Culture
Spain is interested in improving regional nuclear 
security, and is working with Morocco to enhance 
Morocco’s domestic nuclear and radiological security. 
The government also hosted a seminar on WMD 
prevention in 2011 in cooperation with a Spanish think 
tank. In 2011, Spain worked with the IAEA to develop 
a new National Assessment of the DBT. Spain hosted 
a seminar on how to define, integrate, and maintain 
a DBT. In May 2013, Spain co-organized the GICNT 
Radiological Emergency Management Exercise with 
Morocco. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Radioactive 
Sources, Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Initiative.
Sweden
HIGHLIGHTS
Sweden is a major contributor to anti-smuggling 
efforts. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
Sweden repatriated several kilograms of U.S.-origin 
separated plutonium in 2012. 
Culture
In February of 2012, Sweden welcomed an IAEA IPPAS 
mission, and has since requested a follow-up mission. 
It supports the EU CBRN CoEs and hosted the second 
INTERPOL Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking and 
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SWITZERLAND
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 5-10 kilograms
Plutonium: None
SWEDEN
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None*
Terrorism Conference in April of 2012.
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources, Global 
Partnership, Nuclear Information Security, Counter-
Smuggling.
Switzerland
HIGHLIGHTS
Switzerland’s efforts in support of the NSS agenda 
have centered on the connection between cyber and 
nuclear security, and the need for centralized training 
facilities.
OVERVIEW
Governance 
The government drafted a cyber-security strategy that 
focuses on the need to protect critical infrastructure in 
January 2012. 
Culture
Switzerland conducts trainings for personnel in 
radiological and nuclear security at its national Center 
of Competence. This center, which existed prior to the 
summit process, is part of the growing network of 
centers whose expertise is being leveraged to improve 
nuclear security education and training around the 
world. Additionally, Switzerland is part of the IAEA’s 
working group on Nuclear Detection Architecture, 
which plans to publish guidance for states on this 
issue as part of the Nuclear Security Series. 
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources, Global 
Partnership, Nuclear Information Security.
Thailand
HIGHLIGHTS
Thailand has emerged as a proponent for greater 
regional cooperation on nuclear security issues. It 
hosted several regional workshops and established a 
network of regional nuclear regulators with the goal 
of greater information sharing and best practices 
development. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
Thailand enhanced its detection capabilities and now 
has a total of 14 monitoring stations that are used as 
local operation centers for first responders. It also 
plans to establish a nuclear forensics center in its 
Office of Atoms for Peace in 2013.
Governance 
In June 2010, Thailand adopted a new nuclear and 
radiological emergency plan as part of its efforts 
to harmonize efforts to improve nuclear safety and 
security. 
Smuggling
Thailand operates a Megaports Initiative and is 
cooperating with the United States on the Container 
Security Initiative. 
Culture
In 2012, Thailand established ASEANTOM, a regional 
network of nuclear regulators, which will serve 
as a forum for information sharing, best practices 
development, and trainings for Southeast Asia. 
Thailand hosted an ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) Regional Forum  workshop on nuclear 
forensics in December 2011, and is planning several 
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additional regional workshops on nuclear safety and 
security for 2013. It will also host an NSS Sherpa 
meeting in January 2014. 
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources, Nuclear 
Information Security, NSS Outreach.
TURKEY
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: Yes*
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
THAILAND
Treaty Status
CPPNM: No
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
Turkey
HIGHLIGHTS
Turkey’s accomplishments include improvements in 
domestic regulation and expanded detection systems 
to prevent nuclear smuggling. 
OVERVIEW
Governance 
Turkey has updated its domestic legislation with 
respect to nuclear security. 
Smuggling
Turkey deployed portal monitors and outfitted 
organized crime units in 81 provinces and 36 districts 
with radiation dose rate meters. Nearly all customs 
offices in Turkey have been automated, and most 
customs transactions are done electronically. Turkey 
also participates in the European Radiological Data 
Exchange Platforms, which help countries track 
radiological material movement in the region. 
Additionally, Turkey signed a cooperative agreement 
with Iran to that included initiatives to prevent nuclear 
trafficking in 2011.
Culture 
Turkey also is engaged in nuclear security culture 
development in the region. It hosted workshops in 
cooperation with the Global Initiative Study Network 
and Skdeniz University in 2009 and 2010, and a 
commodity identification training program under 
the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security 
Program in Ankara in February 2011. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Nuclear 
Information Security, Counter-Smuggling.
Ukraine
HIGHLIGHTS
Ukraine became the 8th country to eliminate its HEU 
since President Obama’s speech in Prague April 2009, 
which first articulated the four year effort to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. The country 
also has taken significant steps to improve domestic 
legislation associated with nuclear controls and 
physical protection of nuclear and radiological material. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
In March 2012, Ukraine repatriated the last of its 
Russian-origin HEU.77 In a process that began prior to 
the summit and was completed in 2010, Ukraine’s 15 
HEU-powered research reactors were converted to LEU.
Governance 
After updating local laws to comply with international 
terrorism conventions, Ukraine established a new 
State Nuclear Inspectorate to monitor compliance with 
new nuclear security regulations. The government 
also cooperates with the IAEA under its Integrated 
Nuclear Security Support Plan, and is developing 
a new plan for nuclear security assistance with the 
help of the IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security. Since 
the 2010 Washington summit, Ukraine approved a 
national DBT and guidance for an improved physical 
protection system for nuclear materials.78 Ukraine also 
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None
Plutonium: None
UKRAINE
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: None*
Plutonium: None
is conducting training courses in physical protection 
for nuclear industry operators. 
Smuggling
In addition to its work to improve domestic nuclear 
security, Ukraine strengthened its anti-smuggling 
measures. A radioactive detection system was 
established to secure border crossings in the north, 
along interstate highways, and in all major airports. 
There also are ongoing efforts at Ukraine’s national 
laboratories to upgrade equipment to better identify 
bulk-form nuclear materials.
Culture
Ukraine is focusing attention on nuclear security 
trainings; courses on physical security and accounting 
of nuclear materials are conducted at the Kyiv Nuclear 
Research Institute’s center of excellence and at the 
Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and 
Industry. The training programs were developed by 
Ukraine’s nuclear energy company, ENERGOATOM. 
 
Gift Baskets: Global Partnership, Training and 
Support Centers.
United Arab Emirates
HIGHLIGHTS
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has engaged in 
a series of trainings and workshops to improve 
domestic nuclear security culture. Because the country 
is developing a domestic nuclear energy program, 
UAE’s focus has been on improving domestic 
infrastructure and regulation.
OVERVIEW
Governance 
As of 2012, the UAE had passed a series of new 
regulations designed to improve domestic nuclear 
security. The new measures include improvements 
in the physical protection of radioactive materials, 
emergency preparedness, transportation, and 
accounting and control. 
Import and export laws were also strengthened, 
with specific language to prevent the financing of 
nuclear trafficking. 
Smuggling
To further efforts to curb smuggling in the region, 
the UAE is collaborating with the United States to 
implement the Megaports Initiative program at the 
port of Jebel Ali in Dubai. 
Culture
In June 2010, the UAE hosted a plenary meeting for 
the GICNT in Abu Dhabi and organized a regional 
seminar on the implementation of nuclear safety, 
security, and safeguards legislation. In February 
2011, the United States and the UAE announced 
the establishment of the Gulf Nuclear Energy 
Infrastructure Institute, which will train regional 
personnel in how to effectively implement nuclear 
safety, security, and safeguards requirements. In 
November 2011, the UAE hosted a national workshop 
on radioactive source security, and is organizing 
additional meetings, including a regional workshop 
on nuclear security infrastructure for law enforcement 
personnel in 2013. In January 2013, the Gulf 
Cooperation Countries were invited to join the EU 
CBRN CoE project during an event co-hosted by the 
United Arab Emirates. 
Gift Baskets: Radioactive Sources, Training and 
Support Centers, Counter-Smuggling.
45
A
rm
s 
Co
nt
ro
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p 
fo
r 
G
lo
ba
l S
ec
ur
ity
UNITED KINGDOM
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: Yes
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: Yes
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 21.9 tons
Plutonium: 90 tons
United Kingdom
HIGHLIGHTS
The United Kingdom (UK) is a leader in the effort to 
strengthen global nuclear security. It has contributed 
to multilateral efforts to convert reactors and minimize 
the use of HEU, and encouraged trainings to improve 
security culture. The UK implemented domestic 
regulatory reform to better integrate nuclear safety, 
security, safeguards implementation, and radioactive 
materials transport. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
The UK hosted an IPPAS mission to its Sellafield 
site in 2011, and continues to implement the 
recommendations from that review. A follow-up 
mission was requested in 2011, but its date has not 
been set. Since 2010, the UK has contributed to several 
material removal and reactor conversion projects 
through its Global Threat Reduction Programme 
including the shutdown of the BN-350 reactor in 
Kazakhstan and the construction of a centralized 
storage facility for spent radioactive sources in 
Ukraine. 
Governance
Domestic efforts to improve nuclear security 
governance included the establishment of the Office 
for Nuclear Regulation, which is designed to align 
the various regulatory structures that govern nuclear 
material and facilities.79  The country also began 
implementing its new National Strategic Framework to 
prepare for nuclear emergencies and joined the IAEA’s 
Response and Assistance Network which is designed 
to facilitate IAEA assistance to member states in the 
aftermath of a nuclear accident or incident. 
Culture
As chair of the Global Partnership in 2013, the UK is 
leading efforts to coordinate and expand the role of 
the burgeoning group of centers of excellence. The 
UK also provided financial support for WINS. The UK 
National Nuclear Center of Excellence is working to 
develop new, proliferation resistant technology for 
nuclear energy and will share its findings with the 
EU CBRN CoEs. The National Skills Academy added 
a nuclear curriculum, which provides nuclear safety 
and security training to industry employees, and 
supports overall implementation of the UK Nuclear 
Programme. The UK is participating in a multilateral 
master’s program in nuclear security that was officially 
launched in April 2013 and involves universities from 
four other European countries.80 The UK also led 
development of the nuclear information security gift 
basket offered at the 2012 NSS. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Transport 
Security, Global Partnership, Nuclear Terrorism, 
Nuclear Information Security, Training and Support 
Centers, Global Initiative, Counter-Smuggling.
United States of America
HIGHLIGHTS
The United States hosted the first NSS in 2010, the 
first International Regulators Conference on Nuclear 
Security in 2012, and has made significant progress in 
efforts to secure nuclear and radiological material both 
domestically and around the world. 
OVERVIEW
Materials
The United States assisted in the removal of 
more than 400 kg of HEU from 10 countries, and 
downblended more than 450 metric tons of Russian 
HEU fuel, as of July 2012. The United States also 
finalized the Plutonium Management Disposition 
Agreement with Russia in July 2011 which will 
eliminate 34 metric tons of plutonium in both 
countries—enough for 17,000 nuclear weapons. 
Additionally, the necessary administrative action 
to allow 100 kg of separated plutonium to enter the 
United States for storage and disposal was completed. 
To encourage HEU minimization domestically and 
globally, the United States invested $72 million in 
development of new research reactor fuels. The United 
States also revised its national classification guide, 
developed a nuclear forensics lexicon, and created a 
framework for nuclear forensics libraries. 
To enhance domestic security of nuclear and 
radiological material, the United States recovered 
more than 4,000 domestic radioactive sources, 
and completed security upgrades at more than 500 
facilities. All Category I and II special nuclear material 
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has been removed from Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory and more than 10 metric tons of HEU has 
been converted to LEU since the start of the NSS 
process. In total, the United States assisted or led 
efforts to secure nuclear and radiological material in 
more than 1,300 buildings worldwide. 
The United States also has conducted facility 
security assessments at all NNSA facilities and 
is completing security upgrades at  Y-12 and the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory. Security-by-
design features are being incorporated in several 
domestic facilities including the Mixed Oxide Fuel 
Fabrication Facility, HEU Materials Facility, and the 
Uranium Processing Facility. Other security upgrades 
include remotely operated weaponry, enhanced 
communication technologies, new vehicle detection 
cables, advanced thermal and targeting lasers, 
improved explosive detection capabilities, and new 
entry control search technologies.
In June 2012, the United States announced steps to 
minimize the use of HEU for civilian purposes while 
ensuring the reliable supply of medical isotopes, 
particularly Mo-99. These steps included urging 
the Mo-99 industry to voluntarily establish unique 
product codes for goods produced without HEU, 
preferential procurement of non-HEU produced 
products, reduction of HEU exports for medical 
isotopes, and support for conversion of production 
from HEU to LEU. Additionally, the United States the 
American Medical Isotope Production Act became law 
in January 2013. This law calls on the United States 
to phase out the production of medical isotopes over 
a seven year period and establishes a technology-
neutral program to support the production of Mo-99 in 
the United States. 
Governance 
The United States serves as co-chair of the GICNT 
and led efforts to develop and publish INFCIRC225/
Rev 5. The United States also implemented new 
material controls and accounting, physical protection, 
and information security policies based on new 
vulnerabilities assessments and the recommendations 
of INFCIRC225/Rev5. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission developed regulations regarding 
the physical protection of radiological byproduct 
materials, which were assessed by the Government 
Accountability Office. In May 2013, the United States 
House of Representatives passed implementing 
legislation, which brought the country closer to 
completing ratification of the CPPNM amendment 
and ICSANT, but the Senate has yet to act. Also in 
May 2013, new legislation, the Next Generation 
Cooperative Threat Reduction bill, was introduced in 
the Senate to expand support for U.S. threat reduction 
work in the Middle East and North Africa.
Smuggling
The United States is developing and testing new static 
and mobile radiation detection technologies as part 
of its efforts to improve anti-smuggling capability and 
detect the illicit transfer of nuclear and radiological 
material. A database of U.S. nuclear material holdings 
also has been refined to aid law enforcement officials, 
and the United States has reported materials outside 
of legitimate control to the IAEA. The United States 
also continues to improve its counter smuggling 
capacity through increased law enforcement, 
intelligence, and international cooperation.
Culture
The United States hosted the first International 
Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security, which was 
held outside Washington, D.C., in December 2012. In 
February 2013, the United States hosted a workshop 
on nuclear security in its role as chair of the Global 
Partnership. Following the accident at Fukushima, a 
U.S.-Japan Working Group was formed to enhance 
cooperation ahead of the 2012 Seoul summit, conduct 
a peer review of security-by-design implementation 
at processing facilities, and a range of other activities. 
The United States has made financial contributions 
to WINS and also is supporting a WINS-led force-on-
force workshop at the Y-12 National Security complex, 
which will take place over the next three years. 
Additionally, the IAEA will conduct an IPPAS mission 
in 2013. 
Since the start of the NSS process, the United 
States trained more than 1,400 primary responders 
in radiological alarm response. As part of its efforts to 
implement a new strategic plan and domestic search 
plan for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, the 
United States also trained more than 7,500 federal, 
state, and local law enforcement officers in nuclear 
detection techniques. The U.S. Silent Thunder table-top 
exercise program, an interagency effort, is designed 
to provide hands-on crisis management experience, 
facilitate inter-agency coordination, and improve 
emergency response methods using fictional WMD 
terrorism scenarios. Exercises are completed in 
facilities that house nuclear or high-activity radioactive 
materials all across the country. Twelve exercises have 
been completed since October 2011 and two more are 
scheduled for 2013.81 
The United States also is working to address and 
mitigate the insider threat through increased human 
reliability evaluations, security reviews, and new 
training for adjudicators. Further, the United States 
monitors anomalous behavior on computer networks, 
and updated the access requirements to sensitive 
nuclear information. The United States led four 
multilateral joint statements on contributions by the 
GICNT, NSS outreach efforts, nuclear security training 
and support centers, and the Global Partnership, 
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which were presented at the 2012 summit.
Gift Baskets: Nuclear Information Security, Global 
Partnership, Training and Support Centers, National 
Legislation Kit, Counter-Smuggling, NSS Outreach, 
Global Initiative, Transport Security, Medical Isotopes, 
LEU Fuel Project, Semipalatinsk, Nuclear Terrorism.
VIETNAM
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: Yes*
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: No
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: No
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: No
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 1-10 kilograms
Plutonium: None
UNITED STATES
Treaty Status
CPPNM: Yes
CPPNM 2005: No
ICSANT: No
Multilateral Initiatives
ITBD Participation: Yes
PSI: Yes
GICNT: Yes
Global Partnership: Yes
Megaports: No
Nuclear Security Fund Contributor: Yes*
Fissile Material Holdings
HEU: 610 tons
Plutonium: 34 tons
Vietnam
HIGHLIGHTS
Vietnam has made significant progress reducing 
its use and stores of nuclear materials. Successful 
conversion of the Dalat research was completed in 
2011 and in early 2012, Vietnam and Russia signed an 
agreement to return HEU spent fuel from the reactor 
to Russia. This removal is scheduled for 2013. 
OVERVIEW
Materials 
In addition to the conversion of the Dalat research 
reactor, and the related spent fuel removal that is 
planned for 2013, the government established a 
registry of radioactive sources, installed eight new 
radiation detection monitors, and upgraded physical 
protection for 21 radiation facilities with Category 1 
sources.82 
Smuggling
In September 2012, Vietnam’s first Megaports Initiative 
site became operational at Cai Mep International 
Terminal. Vietnam also partnered with the ROK to 
launch a pilot program designed to track radiological 
materials in transit in real-time.83  This initiative is an 
effort led by the ROK to better control radiological 
sources in East Asia.
Culture
Vietnam is cooperating with the IAEA on an Integrated 
Nuclear Security Support Plan and has organized 
workshops on the physical protection of nuclear 
assets and radioactive materials. The first, in October 
2012, focused on training emergency responders in 
the case of a radiological disaster. The second, held 
in December 2012, was a seminar on the necessary 
infrastructure to safely and securely develop nuclear 
power attended by representatives of more than a 
dozen countries in the region. 
Gift Baskets: National Legislation Kit, Nuclear 
Information Security.
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•   44 countries hosted nuclear security related 
workshops, conferences, and exercises84
•   22 countries enhanced their counter-
smuggling, transport security and border control 
capacities85 
•   32 countries strengthened their nuclear 
security laws and regulations86
•   16 countries ratified the 2005 CPPNM 
amendment87
•   9 countries hosted, requested, or are preparing 
for IPPAS missions88
•   9 countries ratified ICSANT89
•   6 countries are planning to repatriate nuclear 
materials ahead of the 2014 NSS90
•   2 countries eliminated all of their HEU91
The NSS process has elevated this issue to the 
highest political level among 53 countries from every 
region of the world. Prior to 2010, nuclear security 
was largely viewed as a technical problem for nuclear 
weapons states. However, that outlook oversimplified 
the threat posed by nuclear materials and 
underestimated the potential consequences of nuclear 
terrorism. The summit process has helped globalize 
this issue and narrow the threat perception gap 
between countries in the developed and developing 
world. 
Broadening the 2012 summit’s agenda beyond fissile 
materials to include radioactive sources has played an 
important role in gaining broader recognition that 
all countries have a stake in improving global nuclear 
security. Though every country does not possess 
fissile materials, radioactive sources are used nearly 
everywhere for medical and industrial purposes and 
could be fashioned into a dirty bomb. Population 
growth and increasing electricity demands also are 
spurring the expansion of nuclear power in new 
regions, and global trade has made the national 
interests of states more closely intertwined than ever 
before. It is therefore crucial that all states recognize 
and actively participate in the international effort 
to secure vulnerable radioactive materials, prevent 
smuggling, and build human capacity.
Measuring improvements in nuclear security at a 
global level is not a simple task. The sensitive nature 
of the materials and installations involved cause 
governments and private companies to err on the side 
of secrecy. Analysts must often rely on news articles, 
press releases, personal experiences, and anecdotes 
to assess the strengths and weaknesses of security 
systems. The nationally-focused nature of the nuclear 
security regime further stymies efforts to take a 
comprehensive look at a “system” that lacks universal 
standards, information sharing requirements, or 
regular peer review mechanisms. 
The lack of cohesiveness in the system extends 
to how states report on their efforts to improve 
nuclear security. The progress reports submitted 
by participants at the 2012 Seoul summit contain 
valuable information, but too often it was difficult, 
and sometimes impossible, to corroborate their data 
with independent sources. The free-form reporting 
style used for the Seoul summit also resulted in 
inconsistent reporting by participating states, further 
complicating efforts to evaluate progress. This report 
aggregated and contextualized the efforts that states 
reported at the 2012 summit and supplemented it 
with additional sources. However, it is necessary to 
E
very country that participated in the March 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit has 
taken steps to improve nuclear security at the national, regional, or international 
level. These activities reflect the principles laid out in the Washington and Seoul 
communiqués and commitments made in the joint statements offered in 2012. Notably, 
since the Seoul summit in March 2012: 
Conclusion
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Lee Myung-Bak, right, president of the Republic of Korea, greets the Netherlands Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal at the 
2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on March 26. The Netherlands will host the next Nuclear Security Summit in March 
2014. 
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note that these efforts are limited by a distinct and 
pervasive lack of transparency and consistency in 
the current nuclear security regime. This needs to 
change, as numerous examples in other fields have 
demonstrated that overzealous confidentiality is itself 
a significant liability. The summit process has made 
progress in demonstrating that more information can 
be safely shared and that cautious openness can help 
lead to greater cooperation among states, but there is 
still much work to be done in this area. 
From Washington to Seoul, a shift occurred from 
countries offering specific national commitments 
(“house gifts”) to multinational joint statements 
(“gift baskets”). This evolution is a useful and positive 
development in tackling issues that no single country 
can adequately address alone, but it also made 
tracking the status of commitment implementation 
with open sources much more difficult. Few news 
articles have been published or press releases issued 
about the status of joint statement collaborations since 
Seoul. Further, there was not a common structure 
to these 13 joint statements, and exact timelines for 
action and intended outcomes were not always clear. 
Ahead of the 2014 NSS, a new version of this report 
will be released that focuses on gift basket results. 
The 2014 summit in The Hague will be an 
important milestone for both the summit process and 
the evolution of the nuclear security regime. It marks 
the end of the four-year effort to secure all vulnerable 
nuclear materials around the world and calls for an 
assessment of what the summit process has achieved. 
Summit participants should acknowledge the progress 
that has been made and the additional work that 
is required over the long-term. Speaking with one 
voice and committing to further collaboration and 
innovation to improve the nuclear security regime 
would be far more useful than simply declaring the 
four year effort a success. Incremental improvements 
have been a key feature of the NSS process to date. 
These actions have been important steps in advancing 
global security, but they have proceeded without 
defining a vision for the ultimate end-state that 
participants hope to achieve. The foundations of the 
nuclear security regime need to be strengthened, not 
just patched.
Nuclear security is a global challenge that requires a 
global response and continuous improvement to stay 
ahead of emerging threats in a complex, globalized 
environment. Summit participants must use the 2014 
NSS to begin defining the future of nuclear security. 
Having drawn the personal attention of world leaders 
to nuclear security issues three times in four years, 
they must not allow the summit process to end 
without outlining a strategy to address the structural 
deficiencies of the current nuclear security regime. 
Eliminating weak links from the international system 
will require time, cooperation, and compromise, but 
these are facts, not justifications for inaction. 
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Joint statements are presented in descending order of the number of signatories. There are 13 statements in all, 
and the full text for each can be found at: http://partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/nss/. Countries with the * led 
the joint statements.
Nuclear Information Security
This statement is designed to encourage improvements in information security through assessment, review, 
best practice development, and implementation of new regulations. Signing states commit to develop and 
strengthen national measures, arrangements, and capacities for effective information security and management. 
Specifically, states will hold national assurance exercises to identify strengths and weaknesses, implement IAEA 
recommendations on information security, and develop mechanisms to continually improve personnel reliability. 
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
 I Gift Baskets from the 
2012 Seoul Nuclear 
Security Summit
SIGNATORIES
Algeria Georgia Kazakhstan Philippines Thailand
Australia Germany Malaysia Poland Turkey
Canada Hungary Mexico Republic of Korea United Arab Emirates
Chile Indonesia Netherlands Spain United Kingdom*
Czech Republic Italy New Zealand Sweden United States
Finland Japan Norway Switzerland Vietnam
France
SIGNATORIES
Australia Finland Kazakhstan Russian Federation
Belgium France Netherlands Sweden
Canada Germany New Zealand Switzerland
Czech Republic Ireland Norway Ukraine
Denmark Italy Poland United Kingdom
European Union Japan Republic of Korea United States*
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Signing states recognize the contribution of more than $55 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund since 2010 
and welcome the continuation of this crucial support. 
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SIGNATORIES
Algeria Hungary Republic of Korea Pakistan
Australia Indonesia Lithuania Philippines
Canada Italy Malaysia Ukraine
Chile Japan Mexico United Arab Emirates
Czech Republic Jordan Morocco United Kingdom
Germany Kazakhstan Netherlands United States*
SIGNATORIES
Australia Hungary Morocco Singapore
Canada Indonesia New Zealand Spain
Czech Republic Italy Norway Sweden
Denmark Japan Philippines Switzerland
Finland Kazakhstan Poland Thailand
Germany* Malaysia Republic of Korea United Arab Emirates
SIGNATORIES
Australia Canada Finland Hungary
Indonesia* Japan Kazakhstan Malaysia
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Philippines
Poland Republic of Korea Spain Turkey
United Kingdom United States Vietnam
Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers 
Security of Radioactive Sources
Signing states note their intent to collaborate with emerging centers of excellence and existing International 
Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers, to support efforts to improve training for nuclear 
security personnel, and provide scientific support for the detection and response to nuclear security events. 
Signing states agree that gaps exist and must be filled to meet targets set in Seoul. The statement encourages 
accession to ICSANT, implementing the Code of Conduct and IAEA Nuclear Security Series, establishment of 
national registers for radioactive sources, and international cooperation to recover lost, missing, or stolen sources 
and maintain control over disused sources. 
National Legislation Implementation Kit on Nuclear Security
Signing states support Indonesia’s initiative to develop a kit that will help states develop more comprehensive 
national legislation to improve nuclear security in accordance with their internal legal processes. The kit is 
intended to address the increase in requests for assistance since the 2010 NSS and the lack of a single template for 
national legislation that can be applied across all countries’ circumstances and systems. 
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Activity and Cooperation on Counter Nuclear Smuggling
SIGNATORIES
Jordan* Canada Czech Republic Finland
France Georgia Hungary Israel
Italy Japan The Republic of Korea Lithuania
Malaysia Philippines Sweden Turkey
United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States United Kingdom
SIGNATORIES
Chile Morocco Nigeria Poland
Republic of Korea Thailand United States*
SIGNATORIES
Australia Netherlands Morocco Russian Federation
Spain United States*
SIGNATORIES
France Japan* Republic of Korea United Kingdom
United States 
Signing states acknowledge the importance of countering nuclear smuggling, including by recovering materials 
outside of regulatory control and prosecuting parties that provide assistance to would-be terrorists and smugglers. 
The statement recognizes that actions that states have already taken to these ends and notes additional measures 
that will be taken. 
Nuclear Security Summit Outreach Efforts
Signing states hosted regional outreach meetings to strengthen global nuclear security through dialogue and 
cooperation and promote the continuation of such outreach efforts to implement the 2010 Communiqué and 
Work Plan, the 2012 Communiqué, and in preparation for the 2014 NSS.
Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear 
Security
Signing states acknowledge the contributions of the GICNT by recognizing its Nuclear Detection Working Group, 
led by the Netherlands, the Nuclear Forensics Working Group, led by Australia, and its Response and Mitigation 
Working Group, led by Morocco. The three groups developed guidance documents on enhancing nuclear and 
radiological detection, created Nuclear Forensics Fundaments for Policy Makers and Decision Makers, and plan to 
focus on best practice development and capacity building to strengthen national emergency response. 
Transport Security
Signing states agree to hold working group meetings with relevant international organizations to address 
transport security issues and support the implementation of INFCIRC225/Rev.5, relationship building among 
centers of excellence, and development of improved technology. A proposal for strengthening transport security 
will be presented at the 2014 NSS. 
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SIGNATORIES
Belgium France Netherlands United States
SIGNATORIES
Belgium France Republic of Korea United States
SIGNATORIES
United States United Kingdom France
SIGNATORIES
Kazakhstan Russian Federation United States
Minimization of HEU and the Reliable Supply of Medical Radioisotopes
The signing states reaffirm their determination to support conversion of European production industries to non-
HEU-based processes by 2015. Goals include eliminating the use of HEU for medical isotope production and 
cooperation to ensure uninterrupted production of isotopes. 
Quadrilateral Cooperation on High-density Low-enriched Uranium Fuel Production 
Nuclear Terrorism
Trilateral Cooperation at the Former Semipalatinsk Test Site
Signing states agree to cooperate on the use of high-density LEU fuel power production technology to further 
minimize the use of HEU in industrial, medical, and research facilities.
The signing states agree to actively engage in international workshops to enhance effectiveness and sustainability 
of physical protection measures included in INFCIRC225/Rev.5. The three states will also engage with the 
international community and share their specialized expertise to strengthen worldwide preparedness to respond 
to the threat of a nuclear device. 
The signers offered the nearly-complete work to eliminate the remnants of past nuclear testing at the 
Semipalatinks Test Site as a model for successful cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation. 
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Notes on Sources
Information on the actions taken, or in progress, 
can be found in the national progress reports, which 
were submitted by participating countries at the 
2012 Seoul Summit. They can be found online at 
partnershipforglobalsecurity.org.
Information on fissile material holdings comes from 
national declarations or the following source, unless 
otherwise noted: 
•   International Panel on Fissile Materials 
(IPFM), “Global Fissile Materials Report 2011: 
Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles 
and Production,” January 10, 2012, http://www.
ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr11.pdf
Not all countries declare their fissile material 
holdings. For some countries, a best estimate of HEU 
and plutonium stockpiles is provided. The symbol 
“±” denotes that there is some uncertainty to the 
estimates provided and that the actual fissile material 
holdings may fall within a larger range.
Some countries are listed as having less than 1 
kilogram of HEU. Despite the remaining amounts, 
these countries are considered cleared of HEU. The 
remaining HEU in these countries is scrap material 
found primarily in old fuel plates and filters, making 
further disposition difficult and unnecessary. 
Throughout this section, when fissile material is 
measured in tons, this refers to metric tons.
Membership in relevant international conventions 
was determined based on whether a country 
has deposited its instrument of ratification. The 
depository for the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the 
CPPNM 2005 amendment is the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). All information on ratifications 
of CPPNM and the CPPNM 2005 amendment can be 
found at
•   IAEA, “Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material,” http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_
status.pdf; and 
•   IAEA, “Amendment to the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/cppnm_ amend_status.pdf. 
The United Nations acts the depository for the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). All information on 
the ratification status of ICSANT is found at
•   “15. International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
United Countries Treaty Collection, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.
aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XVIII~15&c
hapter=18&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#Participants. 
Unless otherwise mentioned, all information on 
membership in the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and on GICNT trainings 
and workshops is from either the
•   “Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
July 18, 2011, or 
•   Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
Key Multilateral Workshops and Exercises http://
www.gicnt.org/download/iag/Complete_List_of_
Past_GICNT_Activities.pdf;
Information on states participating in the 
Proliferation Security Initiative came from the 
Department of State’s Bureaus of International 
Security and Nonproliferation. 
•   “Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/
c27732.htm
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Information on the states participating in the 
IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database came from:
•   “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database: 
Incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material 
out of regulatory control 2013 Fact Sheet,” http://
www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/itdb-fact-
sheet.pdf
•   The status and participants in the G-8 Global 
Partnership: https://www.gov.uk/government/
policies/countering-weapons-proliferation/
supporting-pages/global-partnership
The status and implementation of Megaports 
Initiatives come from one of the two following 
sources: 
•   “Combating Nuclear SmugglingMegaports 
Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability 
Challenges,” GAO-13-37, October 2012, http://
www.gao.gov/assets/650/649759.pdf
•   National Nuclear Security Administration, 
“Megaports Initiative: Protecting the world’s 
shipping network from dangerous cargo and 
nuclear materials,” April 2013, http://nnsa.energy.
gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/
programoffices/internationalmaterial 
protectionandcooperation/-5.  
Information on state contributions to the IAEA 
Nuclear Security Fund can be found in the agency’s 
nuclear security reports of 2010, 2011, and 2012, all 
of which are available at the agency’s website.
•   http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/
nuclearsecurity/
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This Arms Control Association and Partnership for Global Security report seeks 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the progress made on nuclear security 
by 53 countries participating in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process 
since the first summit in 2010. It draws specific attention to actions taken since 
the 2012 summit in Seoul. 
The 2010 and 2012 summits brought high-level attention to the threat posed 
by radioactive materials and spurred countries to take action to prevent 
nuclear terrorism and further enhance global nuclear security. With less than a 
year before the third summit in the Netherlands, it is important to assess the 
progress that participating states have made in strengthening nuclear security 
over the past three years of the summit process. This will aid policymakers in 
determining what work remains to be done at the 2014 NSS and beyond. 
The findings of this report show that while states have taken significant steps 
to lock down vulnerable nuclear material, strengthen international norms, and 
enhance security culture, more work remains to be done. The current regime 
remains a nationally-focused patchwork of laws, voluntary initiatives, and 
recommendations. At the 2014 summit in The Hague, NSS participants should 
push for a more cohesive, transparent, and effective nuclear security regime 
that includes more standardized reporting mechanisms and review measures 
to earn the confidence of the global community. 
